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ABSTRACT
In 2004, for the first time ever, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
applied the little-known temporary-presence defense of 35 U.S.C. § 272 in National Steel
Car v. Canadian Pacific Railway. Section 272 provides a defense to patent infringement
where a foreign vessel, aircraft, or vehicle enters the United States temporarily to engage
in international commerce. The purpose behind § 272 is to prevent domestic patent
enforcement from inhibiting international trade. Although this defense may not be well
known yet, the Federal Circuit’s broad interpretation of § 272 will allow the temporarypresence defense to become more important as the world continues to become smaller
and commerce continues to become more global. Indeed, the vehicles that facilitate
transnational commerce will increasingly need to rely on § 272 in today’s global
economy. This Article first traces the history of the temporary-presence defense, from its
origins in England and the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1850s through the enactment of
§ 272 in the United States in 1952. This Article also discusses U.S. and foreign cases
applying the temporary-presence defense before National Steel Car. Next, this Article
analyzes the decisions of the district court and Federal Circuit in National Steel Car and
concludes that the Federal Circuit was correct in broadly interpreting § 272. Finally, this
Article considers what may be the limits of the scope of the temporary-presence defense
of § 272.

iii

INTRODUCTION
In 2004, for the first time ever, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
applied the little-known temporary-presence defense of 35 U.S.C. § 272 in National Steel
Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pacific Railway.1 This Federal Circuit decision demonstrated that
§ 272 can provide an accused infringer with a powerful defense to patent infringement
where a foreign vessel, aircraft, or vehicle enters the United States temporarily.2
Although this defense may not be well known yet, the temporary-presence defense of
§ 272 should become more important as the world continues to become smaller and
commerce continues to become more global.
Section 272, entitled “Temporary presence in the United States,” provides:
The use of any invention in any vessel, aircraft or
vehicle of any country which affords similar privileges to
vessels, aircraft or vehicles of the United States, entering
the United States temporarily or accidentally, shall not
constitute infringement of any patent, if the invention is
used exclusively for the needs of the vessel, aircraft or
vehicle and is not offered for sale or sold in or used for the

1

Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC II), 357 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir.

2

See id. at 1326 (“In gross, section 272 provides that the use of certain foreign-

2004).

owned means of transit or transport entering into the jurisdiction of the United States
‘temporarily or accidentally’ is not an infringing use provided a host of conditions are
satisfied.”).

Although § 272 and similar provisions distinguish between “vessels,”

“aircraft,” and “vehicles,” see United States v. Reid, 206 F. Supp. 2d 132, 139 (D. Mass.
2002), this Article sometimes uses the word “vehicle” as shorthand to refer to all three.

1

manufacture of anything to be sold in or exported from the
United States.3
Thus, the temporary-presence defense of § 272 has five requirements:
(1)

Vessel, aircraft, or vehicle—the accused invention must be used in a

vessel, aircraft, or vehicle;
(2)

Reciprocity—the vessel, aircraft, or vehicle must be from another country

that provides a similar defense to U.S. vessels, aircraft, or vehicles;
(3)

Temporary or accidental presence—the vessel, aircraft of vehicle must be

present in the United States only temporarily or accidentally;
(4)

Exclusively for the needs of the vehicle—The accused invention must be

used “exclusively for the needs” of the vessel, aircraft, or vehicle; and
(5)

No U.S. sales or manufacturing activity —the accused infringer must not

sell or offer to sell the accused invention, nor use it to manufacture anything to be sold in
or exported from the United States.4
The major object and underlying policy of § 272 is to prevent patent enforcement
from inhibiting international commerce.5 According to the Federal Circuit:
[The temporary-presence defense] demonstrate[s] a
concern to leave the channels of international commerce, or
more accurately the vessels and vehicles that pass through
these channels, free from the excessive burdens that would
result if such vessels or vehicles had to conform to the
patent laws of all nations that the vessel or vehicle visited
during its lifetime. Different inventions are likely to be
3

35 U.S.C. § 272 (2000).

4

Id.; see also Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 197, 240 (1993)

(describing the five elements of § 272).
5

NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1330.

2

patented in different countries, and the same invention may
be owned by different parties in different countries. In
section 272, Congress intended to join an international
movement to place foreign-owned means of international
transport beyond the reach of domestic patentees’ exclusive
rights because the cost of complying with multiple,
inconsistent rights of exclusion provided by the patent
regimes of a large number of countries would likely place
an excessive drag on international commerce.6
Thus, the temporary-presence defense strikes a balance between a patentee’s right to
exclude and the exigencies of international trade.7
6

Id.; see also Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120, 1125-26 (E.D.N.Y.

1974) (“It is difficult to see any other purpose in Section 272 and Article 5ter than to
meet the needs and realities of international trade and navigation.”), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1240
(2d Cir. 1975) (unpublished table decision). Similarly, a commentator in 1930 described
the policy behind the temporary-presence defense as follows:
The right of the patentee to prevent the use of his
invention in foreign vessels or other means of
transportation coming temporarily into the jurisdiction of a
state may cause much inconvenience to the freedom of
communication. It is too rigid to require a foreigner, who
may be altogether ignorant of the grant of a patent in a
country, to secure a license from the patentee for the use of
the invention at the risk of being subjected to seizure of the
machine or engine employed in the construction, fitting out,
or functioning of his vessel or other means of
transportation.
STEPHEN P. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION

OF INDUSTRIAL

PROPERTY 246

(1930).
7

See NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1330; Dan L. Burk, Patents in Cyberspace:

Territoriality and Infringement on Global Computer Networks, 68 TULANE L. REV. 1, 66
(1993); cf. Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1125-26 (“[T]he patent law must not be so interpreted as

3

In today’s global economy, the importance of the temporary-presence defense
should continue to increase. Since the enactment of § 272 in 1952,8 U.S. commerce has
to impair the treaty-making capacity of the nation or to clog its power to regulate foreign
commerce (since that would make patent grants a surrender pro tanto of ‘sovereignty’ to
private persons) . . . .” (citations omitted)).
Interestingly, one commentator has proposed using the balance struck by the
temporary-presence defense of § 272 as a model for dealing with the issue of “enforc[ing]
patent rights infringed by international data communications.” Burk, supra, at 66. He
suggests that:
The temporary presence doctrine represents judicial
recognition that the balance struck in the quid pro quo
patent bargain may be upset by international policy
considerations, particularly when the harm to the patent
holder is slight. Courts that are asked to enforce patent
rights infringed by international data communications will
be required to engage in a similar calculus: the patent
incentive created by Congress must not be eroded, but at
the same time, mechanical application of its provisions
cannot be allowed to compromise important international
goals. Systematic, substantial inroads into a patent holder’s
exclusivity by, for instance, an offshore data haven, are
likely to render the patent worthless and must be
discouraged. Particularly when such activity by data
service providers or subscribers knowingly encroaches on
the patent, imposition of liability for direct infringement
and inducement would be appropriate. By contrast, when
computer network activity occasionally and unwittingly
impinges on the scope of a U.S. patent, the burdens on the
U.S. international position imposed on society by judicial
enforcement of the patent may exceed the value of the
patent incentive.
Id.
8

See S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 9, 28 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N.

2394, 2402, 2422.

4

become increasingly global in nature.9 In particular, the manufacturing of goods now
regularly occurs across borders,10 a phenomenon in which lower-cost transportation has
9

See Stephen F. Befort, A New Voice for the Workplace: A Proposal for an

American Works Councils Act, 69 MO. L. REV. 607, 617 (2004) (“Advances in
technology and transportation have created a global economy in which American firms
must compete on an international basis.”); Michael S. Knoll, Perchance to Dream: The
Global Economy and the American Dream, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1599, 1603 (1993)
(“Between 1950 and 1980, the share of U.S. gross national product (‘GNP’) involved in
international trade increased nearly tenfold, from two percent to almost twenty percent.”).
Indeed, in 2004, U.S. international trade of goods comprised over 1.4-trillion dollars in
imports and over 800-billion dollars in exports. U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade
Division,

U.S.

Trade

in

Goods

and

Services

(June

10,

2005),

http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/historical/gands.pdf.
10

See Arthur Donovan, The Impact of Containerization: From Adam Smith to the

21st Century, REV.

OF

BUS., October 1, 2004, at 10, 14 (“Industrial production is widely

distributed rather than concentrated, and sub-assemblies and semi-finished components
are routinely shipped in containers across borders and oceans . . . .”); Binyamin
Netanyahu, We’re Just Getting Started, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 4, 2005, Opinion, 17
(“Today, we live in a world of choice, . . . where goods can be manufactured on the other
side of the globe and shipped at a pace scarcely imaginable a few decades ago.”); see also
ROGER ALCALY, THE NEW ECONOMY 128-29 (2003) (describing how Dell Computer
ships computers to its customers by having shipping companies combine its computers
made in Austin, Texas with monitors made in Mexico).

5

played a major role.11 Thus, the vehicles that facilitate this transnational commerce will
increasingly need to rely on the temporary-presence defense of § 272 to prevent patent
enforcement from interfering with this important international trade. Vehicles such as
refrigerated trucks, specially modified rail cars, and unique freight aircraft have become
more important in the global economy, thus making the temporary-presence defense
more important. Moreover, the importance of international shipping will likely continue
to increase,12 thus making the temporary-presence defense of § 272 of even greater
importance in the future.
As discussed in detail in this Article, the temporary-presence defense first
originated in England in the 1850s. The defense then came to America via a Supreme

11

See Befort, supra note 9, at 617 (“Advances in technology and transportation

have created a global economy . . . .”); George K. Walker, Information Warfare and
Neutrality, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1079, 1088 (2000) (“The global economy was
made possible by modern transportation.”); see also Donovan, supra note 10, at 13-14
(“[C]ontainerization has taken global commerce to new levels of integration and has
brought greatly increased wealth to many parts of the world. Before the 1960s, moving
general cargoes across oceans cost roughly 10 to 15 percent of the retail value of the
goods carried. . . . Today the cost of shipping goods in containers is between one and two
percent of retail value, 90 percent less than before containerization.”).
12

Chicago: Portal to the World, TRANSP. & DISTRIBUTION, May 2003, at 51, 56

(“[I]nternational freight volumes are growing faster than domestic volume and will
almost double by 2020.”).

6

Court decision in 1856, Brown v. Duchesne,13 which held that even though there was no
temporary-presence statute in effect at the time, a foreign ship was exempt from patentinfringement liability where it was only temporarily present in the United States. Next,
the temporary-presence defense went global in 1925 when it was incorporated into the
Paris Convention. Finally, Congress enacted § 272 as part of the Patent Act of 1952 to
codify the holding of the Supreme Court and the requirements of the Paris Convention.
Although sparse, the case law applying § 272 up to and including National Steel
Car shows the variety of transportation means to which § 272 can apply.

Before

National Steel Car, there were only two cases that interpreted § 272.14 In the first of
these cases, Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc.,15 a district court in 1974 held that § 272 provided
a complete defense to patent infringement for aircraft that were temporarily present in the
United States. In the second case, Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,16 the United
States Court of Federal Claims in 1993 held that § 272 provided a patent-infringement
defense for certain spacecraft.
Moreover, temporary-presence-defense statutes analogous to § 272 exist in many
countries, so there are foreign cases interpreting these statutes. In particular, two cases
are notable. In the first such case, Rolltrailer,17 a German court in 1973 held that the
13

60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1856).

14

Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC II), 357 F.3d 1319, 1327 (Fed.

Cir. 2004).
15

380 F. Supp. 1120 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1975).

16

29 Fed. Cl. 197 (1993).

17

LG Hamburg, GRUR Int. 1973, Heft 12, at 703 (F.R.G.).

7

German temporary-presence statute protected vehicles called “roll trailers” from
infringement liability. In the second such foreign case of interest, Stena Rederi AB v.
Irish Ferries Ltd.,18 an English court held that the U.K. temporary-presence statute
exempted certain ferries from infringement.
Most recently, an accused infringer invoked the temporary-presence defense of
§ 272 in National Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pacific Railway.19 In National Steel Car,
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held in 2003 that the
temporary-presence defense of § 272 did not apply to certain Canadian rail cars that
entered the United States, delivered lumber to U.S. destinations, and then returned empty
to Canada.20

In reaching its conclusion, the district court narrowly interpreted the

elements of § 272, unlike previous courts that considered similar issues. However, in
2004, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and held that the defense
did apply.21 In so doing, the Federal Circuit broadly interpreted § 272. Thus, § 272
remains a potentially powerful defense to patent infringement for operators of foreign

18

[2003] EWCA (Civ) 66 (Eng.).

19

Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC II), 357 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir.

20

Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC I), 254 F. Supp. 2d 527, 556

2004).

(E.D. Pa. 2003), rev’d, 357 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
21

NSC II, 357 F.3d 1319.
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vessels, aircraft, and vehicles of many different types that are present only temporarily in
the United States—a veritable “planes, trains, and automobiles”22 defense.
This Article discusses the history and application of the temporary-presence
defense of § 272. Part I of this Article describes the origins of the temporary-presence
defense and § 272. Next, Part II examines the judicial interpretation of § 272 and the
temporary-presence defense, discussing the two cases interpreting § 272 before National
Steel Car, as well as two foreign cases of interest. Part III of this Article then analyzes
the National Steel Car case. This Part discusses the decisions of both the district court
and Federal Circuit, contrasts the two decisions, and argues that the Federal Circuit’s
interpretation of § 272 was correct. Finally, Part IV considers what may be the limits of
the scope of § 272.

I.

ORIGINS OF 35 U.S.C. § 272 AND THE TEMPORARY-PRESENCE DEFENSE
This Part discusses the origins of § 272 and the temporary-presence defense. Part

I.A discusses the origins of the temporary-presence defense in England in the 1850s.
Next, Part I.B examines the first application of the temporary-presence defense in the
United States by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Duchesne. After that, Part I.C considers
the international adoption of the defense by its incorporation into the Paris Convention as
Article 5ter. Finally, Part I.D describes the enactment of § 272 itself.

22

Planes, Trains & Automobiles was a 1987 movie starring Steve Martin and

John Candy. LEONARD MALTIN’S MOVIE GUIDE 1090 (Leonard Maltin ed., 2005 ed.,
2004).

9

A. ORIGINS IN ENGLAND
The temporary-presence defense originated in England in the 1850s.23 After a
court rejected the defense, England enacted the first temporary-presence statute.24
An accused infringer first raised the temporary-presence defense in Caldwell v.
Vanvlissengen25 in the Chancery Court in 1851, but the court rejected the defense.26 In
Caldwell, the patent at issue covered an improvement to a ship’s propeller.27

The

accused infringers were from Holland and used this invention in Dutch ships that traveled
between Holland and England to engage in trade.28

23

Thus, the ships were only

Maurice A. Moffat, Section 23 of the Patent Act and the St. Lawrence Seaway,

31 C.P.R. 27, 28-30 (1959); see Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 198 (1856);
LADAS, supra note 6, at 246; Rajita Sharma & Heather Forrest, Case Comment, A
Lifeline for Infringing Ships, 2003 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 430, 434.
24

Brown, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 198; LADAS, supra note 6, at 246; Sharma &

Forrest, supra note 23, at 434.
25

9 Hare 415 (Ch. 1851) (Eng.).

26

Id. at 427-31; LADAS, supra note 6, at 246; Moffat, supra note 23, at 28-30;

Sharma & Forrest, supra note 23, at 434.
27

Caldwell, 9 Hare at 425. The court referred to the invention as a “screw

propeller.” E.g., id.
28

Id. at 417-19. Additionally, according to the accused infringers, the invention

in question was not covered by a Dutch patent and “had been openly used and exercised
in . . . Holland.” Id. at 417-18.

10

temporarily present in English waters.29 The patentee sought a preliminary injunction
preventing this use.30 In response, the accused infringers argued that the court should not
“grant an injunction restraining the use by foreigners of the patent on board a ship built in
a foreign country at amity with England, and manned and owned by the subjects of that
country.”31 The accused infringers further argued:
If a right of this kind were asserted against foreigners
coming to [England] it would be a source of great
inconvenience. There was not an article which a foreigner
might bring to this country for his use or comfort but might
be the subject of a patent, and, therefore, the subject of an
application against him. The right, if it existed, might even
be asserted against a ship accidentally driven into an
English port by a tempest or stranded on the coast.32
Although the accused infringers did not characterize their defense as a “temporarypresence” defense, the essence of their argument was that their use of an invention
covered by an English patent on a foreign ship should not amount to infringement where

29

See id. at 417-19.

30

See id. at 423 (describing the issue as “whether the Court will interfere to

protect a patentee before he has established his right at law, or will suspend its
interference until the right at law has been established”).
31

Id. at 421.

32

Id. at 422. This argument is very similar to the Federal Circuit’s description of

the underlying purpose and policy of § 272. Compare id., with Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v.
Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC II), 357 F.3d 1319, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See supra text
accompanying note 6 for a quote of this description.
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the ship would be present in English waters only temporarily for the purpose of engaging
in international trade.33
The court rejected the infringers’ temporary-presence defense.34 The court first
noted the “universal” rule “that foreigners are in all cases subject to the laws of the
country in which they happen to be.”35 The court then observed:
[U]ndoubtedly [the patent] grant gives to the grantee a right
of action against persons who infringe upon the sole and
exclusive right purported to be granted by it. Foreigners
coming into [England] are, as I apprehend, subject to
actions for injuries done by them whilst here to the subjects
of the Crown. Why then are they not to be subject to
actions for the injury done by their infringing upon the sole
and exclusive right, which I have shewn to be granted in
conformity with the laws and constitution of this country?
And if they are subject to such actions, why is not the
power of this Court, which is founded upon the
insufficiency of the legal remedy, to be applied against
them as well as against the subjects of the Crown.36
Ultimately, the court observed that the accused infringers’ argument “resolves itself into
a question of national policy, and it is for the Legislature, and not for the Courts, to deal
with that question: my duty is to administer the law and not to make it.”37 Thus, the
court rejected the temporary-presence defense and granted the preliminary injunction.38
33

See Caldwell, 9 Hare at 421-23.

34

Id. at 423-31.

35

Id. at 425.

36

Id. at 427-28.

37

Id. at 430. In contrast, a few years later, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the

reasoning of Caldwell and did not hesitate to interpret U.S. patent law as incorporating a
temporary-presence defense, even in the absence of any explicit statute. See Brown v.

12

In 1852 in response to the court’s holding in Caldwell, England amended its
patent law to provide for the first temporary-presence defense to patent infringement.39
Members of the House of Commons believed that the absence of such a provision would
hamper commerce between England and other countries.40 This first temporary-presence
statute read:
No letters patent for any invention (granted after the
passing of this Act) shall extend to prevent the use of such
invention in any foreign ship or vessel, or for the
navigation of any foreign ship or vessel, which may be in
any port of Her Majesty’s dominions, or in any of the
waters within the jurisdiction of any of Her Majesty’s
Courts, where such invention is not so used for the
manufacture of any goods or commodities to be vended
within or exported from Her Majesty’s dominions:
Provided always, that this enactment shall not extend to the
ships or vessels of any foreign state of which the laws
authorize subjects of such foreign state, having patents or
like privileges for the exclusive use or exercise of
inventions within its territories, to prevent or interfere with
the use of such inventions in British ships or vessels, or in
or about the navigation of British ships or vessels, while in
the ports of such foreign state, or in the waters within the
jurisdiction of its Courts, where such inventions are not so
used for the manufacture of goods or commodities to be

Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 198-99 (1856). For a discussion of Brown, see infra
Part I.B.
38

Caldwell, 9 Hare at 430. The accused infringers did not appeal the decision in

Caldwell. Moffat, supra note 23, at 28.
39

LADAS, supra note 6, at 246; Moffat, supra note 23, at 28-30; Sharma &

Forrest, supra note 23, at 434.
40

Moffat, supra note 23, at 28.
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vended within or exported from the territories of such
foreign state.41
Like § 272, today’s U.S. temporary-presence statute, the first British statute: (1)
applied to foreign ships temporarily present in the country; (2) excluded from the defense
the use of the patented invention for manufacturing; and (3) required reciprocity between
the two countries at issue with respect to providing a temporary-presence defense.42
However, two important differences between the current U.S. provision and the first
British statute are: (1) the British statute applied only to ships and not to aircraft or land
vehicles, whereas the U.S. provision applies to all three; and (2) the British statute
applied to any use of a patented invention in a vessel or for the navigation of a vessel,
whereas the U.S. statute applies only where the patented invention is used exclusively for
the needs of the vessel.43 Although it has since been amended, the United Kingdom still
has a temporary-presence-defense statute today.44
Soon after its first appearance in England in 1852, the temporary-presence
defense migrated across the Atlantic to the United States.

41

Id. at 30 (emphasis omitted) (quoting British Act of 1852, Clause XXVI).

42

Compare Moffat, supra note 23, at 30 (quoting British Act of 1852, Clause

XXVI), with 35 U.S.C. § 272 (2000).
43

Compare Moffat, supra note 23, at 30, with § 272.

44

Patents Act, 1977, § 60 (U.K.). For a quote of this statute, see infra text

accompanying note 193.
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B. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: BROWN V. DUCHESNE
Soon after the passage of the first British temporary-presence statute but long
before the existence of such a U.S. statute, the temporary-presence defense was first
applied in the United States in 1856 by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Duchesne.45 In
Brown, the patentee owned a patent on “a new and useful improvement in constructing
the gaff of sailing vessels.”46 The accused infringer was a French citizen, who used the
patented invention on a French ship that traveled between a French colony and Boston.47
No French patent covered the invention.48 Indeed, the patentee admitted “that the [ship]
was a foreign vessel, lawfully in a port of the United States for the purposes of

45

60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1856); see Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29

Fed. Cl. 197, 231 (1993) (“The temporary presence doctrine was enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Brown v. Duchesne . . . .”). The first (and only) U.S. temporarypresence statute, 35 U.S.C. § 272, was not enacted until the Patent Act of 1952, S. REP.
NO. 82-1979, at 9 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2402, almost a
century after the Court’s 1856 decision in Brown.
46

Brown, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 193. A “gaff” is “[a] spar attached to the mast and

used to extend the upper edge of a fore-and-aft sail.”
DICTIONARY

OF THE

THE AMERICAN HERITAGE

ENGLISH LANGUAGE 740 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter AMERICAN

HERITAGE DICTIONARY]. A “spar” is “[a] wooden or metal pole, such as a mast, boom,
yard, or bowsprit, used to support sails and rigging.” Id. at 1727.
47

Brown, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 193.

48

See id. at 194.
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commerce, and that the improvement in question was placed on her in a foreign port to fit
her for sea.”49 Thus, the Court framed the issue as:
whether any improvement in the construction or equipment
of a foreign vessel, for which a patent has been obtained in
the United States, can be used by such vessel within the
jurisdiction of the United States, while she is temporarily
there for the purposes of commerce, without the consent of
the patentee.50
In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Roger Taney, the Supreme Court held that
the temporary presence of the ship in the United States provided the accused infringer
with a defense to infringement liability.51 The Court reasoned that such a result flowed
from a proper construction of the patent infringement statute.52 The Court began by
noting that a literal interpretation of the language of the statute did not allow for a
49

Id.

50

Id.

51

See id. at 198-99.

52

Id. at 194-97.

The patent infringement provision in effect in 1856 read:

[I]f any person shall make, devise and use, or sell the thing
so invented, the exclusive right of which shall, as aforesaid,
have been secured to any person by patent, without the
consent of the patentee, his executors, administrators or
assigns, first obtained in writing, every person so
offending, shall forfeit and pay to the patentee, a sum, that
shall be at least equal to three times the price, for which the
patentee has usually sold or licensed to other persons, the
use of the said invention; which may be recovered in an
action on the case founded on this act, in the circuit court of
the United States, or any other court having competent
jurisdiction.
9 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM

ON

PATENTS App. 10-3 (2004) (quoting Patent Act of

1793, Ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318-323, § 5 (1793)).
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temporary-presence defense to infringement.53 However, the Court interpreted the statute
by looking beyond its plain language:
[I]t is well settled that, in interpreting a statute, the court
will not look merely to a particular clause in which general
words may be used, but will take in connection with it the
whole statute (or statutes on the same subject) and the
objects and policy of the law, as indicated by its various
provisions, and give to it such a construction as will carry
into execution the will of the Legislature, as thus
ascertained, according to its true intent and meaning.54
The Court further described its approach as follows:
Neither will the court, in expounding a statute, give
to it a construction which would in any degree disarm the
Government of a power which has been confided to it to be
used for the general good—or which would enable
individuals to embarrass it, in the discharge of the high
duties it owes to the community—unless plain and express
53

See id. at 194 (“The general words used in the clause of the patent laws

granting the exclusive right to the patentee to use the improvement, taken by themselves,
and literally construed, without regard to the object in view, would seem to sanction the
claim of the plaintiff.”).
54

Id. Such an approach to statutory interpretation was consistent with precedent

at the time. See, e.g., United States v. Boisdore’s Heirs, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122
(1850) (“In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member
of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.”).
Indeed, the Court still uses such an approach to statutory interpretation today. See, e.g.,
Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990) (“In determining the meaning of the
statute, we look not only to the particular statutory language, but to the design of the
statute as a whole and to its object and policy.”).
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words indicated that such was the intention of the
Legislature.55
The Court reasoned that Congress did not intend the patent infringement statute to
reach foreign vessels temporarily present in the United States because the constitutional
authority for the patent laws was the Patent Clause, rather than the Commerce Clause.56
The Court observed that where Congress was legislating “to protect authors and
inventors,” Congress was presumably acting under the domestic power granted by the
Patent Clause, “and it ought not lightly to be presumed that they intended to go beyond it,
and exercise another and distinct power, conferred on them for a different purpose.”57
55

Brown, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 195. The Court uses the word “embarrass”

several times throughout the Brown opinion. See id. at 195, 197, 198. At the time of
Brown, the primary meaning of “embarrass” differed from its current connotation. In
1856, the primary meaning of “embarrass” was “[t]o perplex ; to render intricate ; to
entangle.” NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 388
(1854). In contrast, today “embarrass” typically connotes the causing of discomfort or
abashment. See, e.g., AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 46, at 600 (“To
cause to feel self-conscious or ill at ease; disconcert . . . .”).
56

Id. The Patent Clause grants Congress the power “To promote the Progress of

Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8. The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power “To regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
57

Brown, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 195.
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The Court then noted that the Patent Clause “confers no power on Congress to regulate
commerce, or the vehicles of commerce, which belong to a foreign nation, and
occasionally visit our ports in their commercial pursuits.”58

58

Id. The Court also noted that the patent laws “do not, and were not intended to,

operate beyond the limits of the United States.” Id. Indeed, courts cite Brown most often
for this principle—that U.S. patent law has no extraterritorial effect. See, e.g., Deepsouth
Packing Co. v. The Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 527, 531 (1972) (citing Brown, 60 U.S.
(19 How.) at 195); Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 361 F.3d 1355, 1360
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Brown, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 195). This principle is now
axiomatic. See id.
In contrast, the Court in Brown noted that U.S. law does apply to foreigners
present in the United States.

Brown, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 194 (“[U]ndoubtedly every

person who is found within the limits of a Government, whether for temporary purposes
or as a resident, is bound by its laws. . . .”). Similarly, the English court in Caldwell
observed that English law applied to foreigners present in Great Britain. Caldwell v.
Vanvlissengen, 9 Hare 415, 428 (Ch. 1851) (Eng.). However, unlike the Court in Brown,
the court in Caldwell applied this principle in concluding that a foreign ship temporarily
present in the country was liable for patent infringement. See id. at 427-31 (rejecting the
temporary-presence defense); see also supra Part I.A (discussing Caldwell). Thus, the
Court’s holding in Brown that the patent laws did not apply to a foreign vessel using a
patented invention while temporarily present in the United States was far from a foregone
conclusion.
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The Court then further reasoned that there was no infringement liability because
there was at most only a minimal “use” of the patented invention in the United States,
other than in navigating in and out of the harbor.59 The Court observed that the patentee
suffered no real damage from a foreign vessel’s use of his patented invention.60 The
Court noted that the accused infringer only derived a benefit from the use of the patented
invention while the ship was on “the high seas,” not while it was sitting in the harbor in
the United States.61 The Court contrasted this minimal use of the patented invention with
a hypothetical situation in which the accused infringer made or sold the invention in the
United States, in which infringement liability would lie.62
59

See Brown, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 196. The Court stated:
[S]o far as the mere use is concerned, the vessel could
hardly be said to use it while she was at anchor in the port,
or lay at the wharf. It was certainly of no value to her
while she was in the harbor; and the only use made of it,
which can be supposed to interfere with the rights of the
plaintiff, was in navigating the vessel into and out of the
harbor, when she arrived or was about to depart, and while
she was within the jurisdiction of the United States.

Id.
60

See id.

61

Id. However, the court interpreting § 272 in Cali in 1974 questioned the

Supreme Court’s characterization of the use of the patented invention in Brown as nondamaging. Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120, 1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (“Such
a use within the United States would not, perhaps, today be characterized as trivial and
non-damaging since it was inevitable and necessary . . . .”), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir.
1975); see infra Part II.A (discussing Cali).
62

Id.
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Thus, the Court concluded that the patent infringement statute could not be
construed to cover patented inventions used in foreign vessels while only temporarily
present in the United States.63 According to the Court:
[S]uch a construction would be inconsistent with the
principles that lie at the foundation of [the patent] laws; and
instead of conferring legal rights on the inventor, in order
to do equal justice between him and those who profit by his
invention, they would confer a power to exact damages
where no real damage had been sustained, and would
moreover seriously embarrass the commerce of the country
with foreign nations. We think these laws ought to be
construed in the spirit in which they were made—that is, as
founded in justice—and should not be strained by technical
constructions to reach cases which Congress evidently
could not have contemplated, without departing from the
principle upon which they were legislating, and going far
beyond the object they intended to accomplish.64
The Court went on to discuss that a construction failing to recognize a temporarypresence defense would improperly confer political power on patentees, rather than just a
property right.65 The Court explained that such a construction would “enable [patentees]
to embarrass the treaty-making power in its negotiations with foreign nations, and also to
interfere with the legislation of Congress when exercising its constitutional power to
63

See id. at 196-97.

64

Id. at 197. It is ironic that the Court considered that it would be a “strained . . .

technical construction[]” to interpret the statute according to its plain language as
applying to any “use within the United States.”

Id.

Arguably, it is the Court’s

interpretation that is strained in its holding that despite the plain language of the statute
there is no infringement where a foreign vessel uses a patented invention while
temporarily present in the United States.
65

See id. at 197-98.
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regulate commerce.”66

The Court then observed that the patentee’s proposed

construction would give the patentee a private right at the expense of public rights: “[N]o
sound rule of interpretation would justify the court in giving to the general words used in
the patent laws the extended construction claimed by the plaintiff, in a case like this,
where public rights and the interests of the whole community are concerned.”67

66

Id. at 197. The Court noted that
if a treaty should be negotiated with a foreign nation, by
which the vessels of each party were to be freely admitted
into the ports of the other, upon equal terms with its own,
upon the payment of the ordinary port charges, and the
foreign Government faithfully carried it into execution, yet
the Government of the United States would find itself
unable to fulfill its obligations if the foreign ship had about
her, in her construction or equipment, anything for which a
patent had been granted.

Id.
67

Id. at 198.

Brown v. Duchesne provides an early example of where the

Supreme Court held that the public interest trumped private property rights. See id. In
discussing Brown in the context of interpreting § 272, the district court in Cali in 1974
cited a much later case, Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-44
(1934), for the proposition that “Brown v. Duchesne means at minimum that the patent
law must not be so interpreted as to impair the treaty-making capacity of the nation or to
clog its power to regulate foreign commerce (since that would make patent grants a
surrender pro tanto of ‘sovereignty’ to private persons).” Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380
F. Supp. 1120, 1125-26 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (also citing Norman v. Baltimore & O.R. Co.,
294 U.S. 240, 316 (1935)), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1975).
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Similar to its much earlier holding in Brown, the Court’s holding in Blaisdell
recognized that public concerns sometimes must trump private rights. See Blaisdell, 290
U.S. at 442. In Blaisdell, in the context of interpreting the Contract Clause, the Court
was confronted with the tension between the public interest and private contract rights.
See id. at 442-44. The Court in Blaisdell described the evolutionary nature of the issue of
public versus private rights under the Contract Clause:
It is manifest . . . that there has been a growing appreciation
of public needs and of the necessity of finding ground for a
rational compromise between individual rights and public
welfare. The settlement and consequent contraction of the
public domain, the pressure of a constantly increasing
density of population, the interrelation of the activities of
our people and the complexity of our economic interests,
have inevitably led to an increased use of the organization
of society in order to protect the very bases of individual
opportunity. Where, in earlier days, it was thought that
only the concerns of individuals or of classes were
involved, and that those of the state itself were touched
only remotely, it has later been found that the fundamental
interests of the state are directly affected; and that the
question is no longer merely that of one party to a contract
as against another, but of the use of reasonable means to
safeguard the economic structure upon which the good of
all depends.
Id.; see also Samuel R. Olken, Charles Evans Hughes and the Blaisdell Decision: A
Historical Study Of Contract Clause Jurisprudence, 72 OR. L. REV. 513, 516 (1993)
(“[Blaisdell’s] points about the public interest in private contracts reflect an evolutionary
process . . . .”). Confirming the evolutionary nature of this issue is Justice Cardozo’s
unpublished concurring opinion in Blaisdell: “The . . . court in its interpretation of the
contract clause has been feeling its way toward a rational compromise between private
rights and public welfare.” G. Edward White, The “Constitutional Revolution” as a
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Finally, the Court expressly rejected the patentee’s argument that the Court should
adopt the holding of the English case of Caldwell v. Vanvlissengen.68 In Caldwell, the
court concluded that “the question of the exemption of foreign vessels [from patent
infringement] is one of national policy, and to be dealt with by the Legislature, rather
than by the courts.”69 In rejecting the reasoning of Caldwell, the Court stated that it
“must interpret our patent laws with reference to our own Constitution and laws and
judicial decisions.”70
Therefore, the Court concluded that the accused infringer should not be liable for
patent infringement because of the temporary-presence doctrine:
[T]he rights of property and exclusive use granted to a
patentee does [sic] not extend to a foreign vessel lawfully
entering one of our ports; and that the use of such
improvement, in the construction, fitting out, or equipment
of such vessel, while she is coming into or going out of a
port of the United States, is not an infringement of the
rights of an American patentee, provided it was placed
upon her in a foreign port, and authorized by the laws of
the country to which she belongs.71
Thus, by Supreme Court precedent, the temporary-presence defense became part of U.S.
patent law in 1856, long before the existence of a temporary-presence statute.
Crisis in Adaptivity, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 884 (1997). Thus, the holding in Brown may
have been ahead of its time.
68

Brown, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 198 (citing Caldwell v. Vanvlissengen, 9 Hare 415

(Ch. 1851) (Eng.)). For a discussion of Caldwell, see supra Part I.A.
69

Brown, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 184.

70

Id. at 198.

71

Id. at 198-99.
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C. ARTICLE 5TER OF THE PARIS CONVENTION
Eventually, the temporary-presence defense was adopted internationally. The
first general temporary-presence-defense provision72 was added to the Paris Convention
in 1925.73 The Paris Convention was “the first major international treaty designed to help

72

Although the Paris Convention contained the first general temporary-presence

provision covering ships, land vehicles, and aircraft, several years earlier in 1919 a
temporary-presence provision was incorporated into the 1919 Convention for the
Regulation of Aerial Navigation. LADAS, supra note 6, at 246; Sharma & Forrest, supra
note 23, at 434. This provision read:
Every aircraft passing through the territory of a
contracting State, including landing and stoppages
reasonably necessary for the purpose of such transit, shall
be exempt from any seizure on the ground of infringement
of patent, design, or model, subject to the deposit of
security the amount of which in default of amicable
agreement shall be fixed with the least delay by the
competent authority of the place of seizure.
LADAS, supra note 6, at 246 (quoting Article 18 of the 1919 Convention); accord Sharma
& Forrest, supra note 23, at 434 n.12.

As one commentator described, this provision

was quite limited compared to the later provision of the Paris Convention:
This timid attempt concerned only aircraft.
Furthermore, it did not declare permissible the use of a
patented invention in its construction, fitting out, or
functioning. The Convention exempted aircraft from
seizure only on condition of deposit of security.
LADAS, supra note 6, at 247; see also Sharma & Forrest, supra note 23, at 434-35.
73

LADAS, supra note 6, at 247; Sharma & Forrest, supra note 23, at 435. The

original version of this temporary-presence provision, Article 5ter, read:

25

the people of one country obtain protection in other countries for their intellectual
creations in the form of industrial property rights,” including patents, trademarks, and
industrial designs.74 The Paris Convention was ratified in 1883 and first went into effect

In each of the contracting countries the following
shall not be considered as infringing the rights of the
patentee:
(1) The use on board ships of other Unionist
countries of anything the subject matter of his patent in the
body of the ship, in the machinery, tackle, apparatus, and
other accessories when such ships enter temporarily or
accidentally the waters of the country, provided that such
thing is employed there exclusively for the needs of the
vessel.
(2) The use of anything the subject matter of the
patent in the construction or functioning of the engines of
locomotion for air or land of the other Unionist countries,
or of the accessories of these engines, when these enter the
country temporarily or accidentally.
Protection of Industrial Property:

Message from the President of the United States

Transmitting Certified Copy of a Convention Signed at the Hague on November 6, 1925,
by the Plenipotentiaries of the United States and of the Other Governments Members of
the International Union for the Protection of Industrial Property, Modifying the
International Convention of March 20, 1883, Revised at Brussels on December 14, 1900,
and at Washington on June 2, 1911, at 9 (1930) [hereinafter Original Article 5ter].
74

World Intellectual Property Organization, Treaties and Contracting Parties:

General Information, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/general/ (last visited Aug. 14,
2005).
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in 1883 with fourteen signatory nations.75 Since then, the Paris Convention has been
revised several times, with the last revision in Stockholm in 1967.76 As of January 2005,
the Paris Convention had 169 signatory nations.77
The current version of the temporary-presence provision of Article 5ter of the Paris
Convention provides:
In any country of the Union the following shall not
be considered as infringements of the rights of a patentee:
1.
the use on board vessels of other countries
of the Union of devices forming the subject of his patent in
the body of the vessel, in the machinery, tackle, gear and
other accessories, when such vessels temporarily or
accidentally enter the waters of the said country, provided
that such devices are used there exclusively for the needs of
the vessel;
2.
the use of devices forming the subject of the
patent in the construction or operation of aircraft or land
vehicles of other countries of the Union, or of accessories
of such aircraft or land vehicles, when those aircraft or land
vehicles temporarily or accidentally enter the said
country.78
75

WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WIPO INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY HANDBOOK:

POLICY, LAW

AND

USE 241 (2d ed. 2004), available at

http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/iprm/.
76

Id. at 241-42.

77

World Intellectual Property Organization, Paris Convention for the Protection

of Industrial Property, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/documents/pdf/d-paris.pdf, at 7
(last updated January 3, 2005).
78

Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5ter, opened for

signature Mar. 20, 1883, 25 Stat. 1372, as revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T.
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The first paragraph of Article 5ter relates to the use of patented inventions on ships; the
second paragraph relates to aircraft and land vehicles.79 Overall, the requirements of
Article 5ter are quite similar to those of § 272:

(1) vessel, aircraft, or vehicle; (2)

reciprocity; (3) temporary or accidental presence; and (4) exclusively for the needs of the
vehicle.80 However, Article 5ter and § 272 differ in that unlike § 272, Article 5ter has no
restriction on domestic sales or manufacturing activity.81 Since its adoption, Article 5ter
has led to temporary-presence statutes in many countries, including the United States.82
1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention art. 5ter]. The changes in Article
5ter from the original 1925 version to today’s version do not appear to be substantive.
Compare Original Article 5ter, supra note 73, with Paris Convention art. 5ter, supra.
79

See Paris Convention art. 5ter, supra note 78; see also LADAS, supra note 6, at

80

Compare Paris Convention art. 5ter, supra note 78, with 35 U.S.C. § 272 (2000).

81

Compare Paris Convention art. 5ter, supra note 78, with § 272.

82

See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 272 (2000); Patents Act, 1990, § 118 (Austl.); Patent Act,

247.

R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 23 (Can.); Patenttilaki [Patents Act], No. 550 of Dec. 15, 1967, as last
amended by Act No. 243 of Mar. 21, 1997, § 5 (Fin.); Patentgesetz [Patent Law], Dec.
16, 1980, as last amended by the Laws of July 16 and August 6, 1998, § 11(4)-(6)
(F.R.G.); Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, § 49 (India); Patents Act, 1992, § 42(d)-(e) (Ir.)
available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1992_1.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2005);
Patents Law, 5727-1967, § 181 (Isr.); The Industrial Property Act, (1989) Cap. 509
§ 38(3) (Kenya); Rijksoctrooiwet [Patents Act], art. 54 (Neth.); The Patents Act 1953,
§ 79 (N.Z.); Ley No. 354, Sep. 19, 2000, Ley de Patentes de Invención, Modelo de
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D. CONGRESS ENACTS SECTION 272
The holding in Brown and Article 5ter of the Paris Convention led to the
enactment of the U.S. temporary-presence-defense statute, 35 U.S.C. § 272, as part of the
Patent Act of 1952.83 Section 272 has only two brief pieces of legislative history.84 The
Utilidad y Diseños Industriales [Law of Patents, Utility Models, and Industrial Designs],
§ 46(b) (Nicar.); Lov om patenter [Patents Act], Act No. 9 of Dec. 15, 1967, as last
amended by Act No. 104 of Dec. 20, 1996, § 5 (Nor.); Ustawa O Wynalazczosci [Law on
Inventive Activity], Oct. 19, 1972, as amended by the Law of Apr. 16, 1993, art. 15(5)
(Pol.); Estatuto de la Propiedad Industrial [Industrial Property Code], Royal Decree-Law
of July 26, 1929, as last amended by Law No. 17/1975 of May 2, 1975, § 52 (Spain); Loi
Fédérale Sur les Brevets d’Invention [LBI] [Federal Law on Patents for Inventions], June
25, 1954, as last amended on Mar. 24, 1995, art. 35(3) (Switz.); Patents Act, 1977, § 60
(U.K.); Patents Act, 1971, as last amended by Act 20/1994 (s. 7), Ch. 26:03, § 81
(Zimb.).
83

See S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 9, 28 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N.

2394, 2402, 2422. Section 272 was amended once in 1994 as part of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§ 272 (2000)).

The purpose of this Act was to “implement the trade agreements

concluded in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations,” which were
“conducted under the auspices of the GATT” (i.e., the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade). S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 1-2 (1994). Among other things, the patent provisions
of this Act “amend[ed] the definition of infringing activity to include offers for sale.” Id.
at 10. Thus, the Act amended § 272 to correspond to this change in the definition of
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first piece of legislative history reads: “Section 272 is a new section in the law relating to
infringement, but it is of relatively little importance and it follows a paragraph in a treaty
to which the United States is a party.”85 The second piece of legislative history reads:
“This section follows the requirement of the International Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property, to which the United States is a party, and also codifies the holding
infringing activity by eliminating the phrase “not sold” and replacing it with “not offered
for sale or sold.” Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 272 (2000)); S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 512 (1994).
84

Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC II), 357 F.3d 1319, 1326 (Fed.

Cir. 2004).

Although it is not actual legislative history, it is informative that P.J.

Federico, one of the drafters of the Patent Act of 1952, described § 272 as follows:
Section 272, which is new, providing that use of a patented
invention in a vessel, aircraft or vehicle of a foreign
country temporarily in the United States shall not constitute
infringement, follows a provision in the International
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, to
which the United States is a party, and also codifies a
holding of the Supreme Court that use of a patented
invention on board a foreign ship does not infringe a patent.
The general definition of vessel and vehicle in 1 U.S.C.A.
§§ 3 and 4 would be applicable here.
P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 1954),
reprinted in 75 J. PATENT TRADEMARK OFFICE SOCIETY 161, 214 (1993). The Federal
Circuit recently relied on this commentary in interpreting the term “vehicle” in § 272.
NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1328; see infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the Federal Circuit’s
interpretation of the term “vehicle” in § 272).
85

S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 9 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394,

2402.
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of the Supreme Court that use of a patented invention on board a foreign ship does not
infringe a patent.”86
It is unfortunate that Congress chose to describe § 272 as “of relatively little
importance.”87 Although the revision to § 272 may have been less important than the
other major revisions encompassed within the Patent Act of 1952,88 § 272 nonetheless
86

Id. at 28, as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2422. In this legislative history,

the phrase “the requirement of the International Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, to which the United States is a party” refers to Article 5ter of the Paris
Convention. See NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1326. Moreover, “the holding of the Supreme
Court” to which the legislative history refers is that of Brown v. Duchesne. See id.; Cali
v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120, 1125 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (“It will be seen that
Brown v. Duchesne is to some extent the source of the ideas and language in Section 272
. . . .”), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1975); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed.
Cl. 197, 231 (1993).
Article 5ter itself has no force of law because the Paris Convention is not selfexecuting.

In re Rath, 402 F.3d 1207, 1209-10 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Kawai v.

Metlestics, 480 F.2d 880, 884 (C.C.P.A. 1973)). As such, it was necessary for Congress
to enact § 272. See id. at 1209 (holding that the Paris Convention had “no direct effect
until implemented by domestic law”).
87

S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 9 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394,

88

The 1952 Patent Act was a major amendment to the existing patent statutes,

2402.

completely rewriting the patent statutes “[f]or the first time since 1879.” Federico, supra
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remains

an

important

defense

to

accused

infringers

under

the

appropriate

circumstances.89 Indeed, according to the district court in Cali, the “adoption [of § 272]
implies that [this provision was] understood to create a useful immunity from
infringement liability that was of enough importance to occupy the attention of the
Congress and the negotiators of two treaties.”90

Moreover, the temporary-presence

defense of § 272 should become even more important as commerce continues to become
more global.91 Since its enactment in 1952, U.S. courts have applied § 272 several times.

II.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 272 AND THE
TEMPORARY-PRESENCE DEFENSE BEFORE NATIONAL STEEL CAR
This Part discusses cases interpreting § 272 and the temporary-presence defense
before National Steel Car. As discussed below, the case law applying § 272 up to and
including National Steel Car shows the variety of means of transportation to which § 272
can apply—namely airplanes, spacecraft, “roll trailers,” ferry boats, and rail cars.

This

case law includes two U.S. cases interpreting § 272, as well as foreign cases of interest
interpreting temporary-presence-defense statutes analogous to § 272. Part II.A examines
note 84, at 163. The Act had two purposes: (1) to substantively change some of the
existing patent law and (2) to codify the existing patent statutes and some case law. Id. at
170.
89

See NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1325-34; Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1124-28; Hughes

Aircraft, 29 Fed. Cl. at 240-41.
90

Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1126.

91

See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of the

temporary-presence defense in today’s global economy).
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Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc.,92 in which a district court in 1974 held that § 272 provided a
complete defense to patent infringement for aircraft that were temporarily present in the
United States. Next, Part II.B discusses Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,93 in which
the United States Court of Federal Claims in 1993 held that § 272 provided a patentinfringement defense for certain spacecraft. Finally, Part II.C considers two foreign cases
of interest—one from Germany and one from the United Kingdom.

A. CALI V. JAPAN AIRLINES, INC.
The first case to interpret § 272 was Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc.,94 in which the
meaning of “entering the United States temporarily” was at issue.95 In Cali, a patentee
sued three foreign airlines for infringement of a patent covering a modification to a jet

92

380 F. Supp. 1120 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1975).

93

29 Fed. Cl. 197 (1993).

94

Cali, 380 F. Supp. 1120.

95

Id. at 1124. No other elements of § 272 were at issue in Cali. The accused

aircraft in question were clearly aircraft of other countries that provided reciprocal
temporary-presence privileges. See id. at 1127. Additionally, the parties did not dispute
that the accused engines were used exclusively for the needs of the aircraft. See id. at
1122. Finally, there was no allegation that the accused engines were “offered for sale or
sold in or used for the manufacture of anything to be sold in or exported from the United
States.” § 272; see Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1122.
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engine.96 The patentee claimed that these airlines infringed the patent by using the
engines in regularly scheduled flights into, out of, and over the United States.97 Indeed,
the court characterized these flights as “regular, of very considerable extent, long
continued, and supported by ground service, marketing facilities, etc.”98 The patentee
argued that § 272 should not provide the accused infringers with an infringement defense
because: (1) the accused aircraft were not “temporarily” present in the United States
under a proper interpretation of § 272 and (2) § 272 was unconstitutional.99 The court
rejected both these arguments and held that § 272 and Article 5ter of the Paris
96

Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1122 (citing Axial Flow Compressors for Jet Engines,

U.S. Patent No. 3,265,290 (filed Sept. 1, 1964)). In an earlier decision in the same case,
the Second Circuit described the patentee and his invention as follows:
Cali . . . is a mechanic employed by one of the
pioneers in the airlines industry, Pan American World
Airways (Pan Am). The kernel of the patented invention
which is the subject of this suit was contained in an idea
which Cali submitted to Pan Am on a standard form
soliciting employees’ suggestions in December 1962. . . .
Cali’s proposal apparently resulted in the correction of a
persistent defect in the design of the JT-4 jet engine, then
used in Pan Am’s Boeing 707 and Douglas DC-8 aircraft
before the introduction of the fan jet. Cali’s ‘suggestionbox’ solution had eluded the industry’s professional
engineers.
Cali v. E. Airlines, Inc., 442 F.2d 65, 66 (2d Cir. 1971) (reversing grant of summary
judgment in favor of accused infringer for invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) based on
alleged public use).
97

Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1122.

98

Id.

99

Id. at 1123-24.
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Convention100 provided the airlines with “a complete defense to the claims against them
for patent infringement.”101 The court held that “temporarily” means no “less than

100

The court also relied on Article 27 of the Chicago Convention on International

Civil Aviation of 1944. See id. at 1123-24, 1126-28. Article 27, entitled “Exemption
from seizure on patent claims,” provides for a temporary-presence defense to patent
infringement for aircraft:
(a) While engaged in international air navigation,
any authorized entry of aircraft of a contracting State into
the territory of another contracting State or authorized
transit across the territory of such State with or without
landings shall not entail any seizure or detention of the
aircraft or any claim against the owner or operator thereof
or any other interference therewith by or on behalf of such
State or any person therein, on the ground that the
construction, mechanism, parts, accessories or operation of
the aircraft is an infringement of any patent, design, or
model duly granted or registered in the State whose
territory is entered by the aircraft, it being agreed that no
deposit of security in connection with the foregoing
exemption from seizure or detention of the aircraft shall in
any case be required in the State entered by such aircraft.
(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this Article
shall also be applicable to the storage of spare parts and
spare equipment for the aircraft and the right to use and
install the same in the repair of an aircraft of a contracting
State in the territory of any other contracting State,
provided that any patented part or equipment so stored shall
not be sold or distributed internally in or exported
commercially from the contracting State entered by the
aircraft.
(c) The benefits of this Article shall apply only to
such States, parties to this Convention, as either (1) are
parties to the International Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property and to any amendments thereof; or (2)
have enacted patent laws which recognize and give
adequate protection to inventions made by the nationals of
the other States parties to this Convention.
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entering for the purpose of completing a voyage, turning about, and continuing or
commencing a new voyage,”102 and that § 272 was not unconstitutional.103
The patentee first argued that § 272 should not apply because the accused
aircraft would not be “temporarily” present in the United States.104

The patentee

contended that § 272 “cannot be taken to cover the maintenance of a regular and
systematic international aircraft service to the United states [sic], including overflights of
it.”105 The court disagreed. The court began by looking at the Supreme Court’s holding

Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 27, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 295. The scope of the Chicago Convention is broader than that of § 272
because it “allow[s] the ‘storage of spare parts and spare equipment for the aircraft’ in the
domestic country.” 5 CHISUM, supra note 52, § 16.05[4], at 16-247 n.12.
101

Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1124. To the extent that the court relied directly on

Article 5ter as a source of law, rather than just § 272, the court was incorrect because the
Paris Convention is not self-executing. In re Rath, 402 F.3d 1207, 1209-10 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (citing Kawai v. Metlestics, 480 F.2d 880, 884 (C.C.P.A. 1973)).
The procedural posture of Cali was that the patentee had moved “for summary
judgment in substance striking the defenses based on Section 272.” Id. at 1128. The
court denied the patentee’s motion. Id.
102

Id. at 1126.

103

Id. at 1127-28.

104

Id. at 1124.

105

Id.
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in Brown v. Duchesne.106 The court observed that Brown “means at a minimum that the
patent law must not be so interpreted as to impair the treaty-making capacity of the nation
or to clog its power to regulate foreign commerce.”107 The court further reasoned that the
holding of Brown “does not mean . . . that only trivial uses” fall under § 272, even though
“[t]he [Supreme] Court emphasized the ‘no damage’ aspect in reaching its conclusion.”108
Additionally, the court looked to the negotiating history of Article 5ter of the Paris
Convention for insight into the meaning of “temporarily.”109 The court observed that a
committee considering the adoption of Article 5ter at the Hague Conference discussed the
meaning of “temporarily.”110 According to the court, “the committee indicated that the
words ‘temporarily’ and ‘accidentally’ were chosen to cover entries into port for more or

106

Id. at 1124-26 (discussing Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1856)).

For a discussion of Brown, see supra Part I.B.
107

Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1125-26.

108

Id. at 1126.

109

Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1124. The court relied on the negotiating history of this

treaty provision in interpreting § 272 because
the United States has in substance so interpreted its own
patent laws in unhesitatingly becoming a party to the Paris
Convention and the Chicago Convention, both of which
specifically deal with the very subject matter of Brown v.
Duchesne and Section 272, and do so in an historical
evolution which furnishes an insight into the meaning of
the word ‘temporarily’ as used in the phrase ‘entering the
United States temporarily or accidentally.’
Id. at 1126.
110

Id.
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less brief periods whether periodically or exceptionally and whether unintentionally or
not.”111
Thus, the court concluded that “‘[t]emporarily’ . . . could not sensibly mean any
less than entering for the purpose of completing a voyage, turning about, and continuing
or commencing a new voyage.”112 The court reasoned:
The enactment of Section 272 and the adoption of
Article 5ter would be incomprehensible if they were
intended to cover only trivia. Their adoption implies that
they were understood to create a useful immunity from
infringement liability that was of enough importance to
occupy the attention of the Congress and the negotiators of
two treaties. Their language was chosen to deal with an
internationally significant matter arising in a world in
which scheduled freight and passenger services by
established international carriers by air and sea were likely
to require such an immunity to cover countless articles
aboard aircraft or vessels that could turn out to be covered
by patents in the United States that were without
counterpart abroad. It is difficult to see any other purpose
in Section 272 and Article 5ter than to meet the needs and
realities of international trade and navigation.113
The court then drew an important distinction between domestic and international
traffic:

111

Id.

112

Id.

113

Id.
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The distinction would be between a Caravelle,114
manufactured in France and powered with such an engine,
delivered here for use by an airline in this country for
domestic traffic, even though manufactured and sold in
France, and a foreign aircraft arriving here on an
international flight only to unload, turn about, reload and
depart.115
The court concluded that the travels of the accused aircraft were international, rather than
domestic, in character.116 Therefore, the accused aircraft were “temporarily” present in
the United States and covered by § 272.117
The court also considered and rejected the patentee’s argument that § 272 is
unconstitutional.118 Specifically, the patentee argued “that if an invention is patentable,
the Government [sic] is constitutionally precluded from according the inventor anything
less than the exclusive grant described in the Constitution and provided for in” 35 U.S.C.
§ 154.119 In rejecting this argument, the court noted that the Patent Clause “is not self-

114

The Caravelle was “[a] highly successful French-built medium-range airliner,

[which] was one of the first commercial aircraft to place its two jet engines at the tail.”
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AVIATION 42 (1977). The Caravelle made its first flight in 1955 and
entered regular service in 1959. Id.
115

Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1126.

116

See id. at 1124.

117

See id.

118

See id. at 1123-25, 1127-28.

119

Id. at 1123-24. Section 154 provides, in relevant part: “Every patent shall

contain . . . a grant to the patentee . . . of the right to exclude others from making, using,
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executing.”120

The court observed that the Patent Clause “empowers but does not

command the Congress to grant patent rights, and the source of any specific right is the
statute which defines the nature and extent of the patent right granted.”121 The court then
noted that under Supreme Court precedent, “Congress having created the monopoly, may
put such limitations upon it as it pleases.”122 Thus, § 272 merely represents a permissible
limitation on the patent monopoly.123
The patentee also argued that the application of § 272 and Article 5ter of the Paris
Convention amounted to an unconstitutional taking.124 However, the court rejected this
argument.125 The court reasoned:
Whatever might have been the case as to patents granted
before Brown v. Duchesne, it has not been the case as to
patents granted since the expiration of the patents then
extant. All such later patents have Brown v. Duchesne read
into them. . . . The enactment of the patent law under the
constitutional provision simply was not a compact with all
future inventors never to make such treaties as the Paris and
Chicago Conventions and never to add a Section 272 to the
patent laws. That is what Brown v. Duchesne decided in
pointing out that the patent law must not be interpreted to

offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the
invention into the United States . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2000).
120

Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1124.

121

Id.

122

Id. (quoting Mast, Foos, & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 494 (1900)).

123

See id.

124

Id. at 1127.

125

Id. at 1127-28.
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abridge the nation’s capacity to carry on its treaty-making
powers and its power to regulate foreign commerce.126
Thus, because the patent in suit was issued in 1966, after the enactment of § 272, Article
5ter of the Paris Convention, and Article 27 of the Chicago Convention, the court
reasoned that these provisions “were integral limitations on the [patent] grant.”127
Therefore, the court ultimately concluded
that the statute, Section 272, and the Paris Convention,
Article 5ter, cannot be so narrowly interpreted as [the
patentee] contends, and that Article 27 of the Chicago
Convention, Article 5ter, of the Paris Convention, and
Section 272, are constitutionally valid as applied to the
[accused infringers’] uses of [the patentee’s] patented
engines, and, therefore, accord [the accused infringers] a
complete defense to the claims against them for patent
infringement.128
The Second Circuit subsequently affirmed this decision without an opinion.129

B. HUGHES AIRCRAFT CO. V. UNITED STATES
The second case interpreting § 272 before National Steel Car was Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. United States.130 In Hughes Aircraft, the Court of Federal Claims held
that the temporary-presence defense of § 272 did not apply to spacecraft launched before

126

Id. at 1128.

127

Id.

128

Id. at 1124.

129

See Cali v. Japan Airlines Co., 535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1975) (unpublished

table decision).
130

29 Fed. Cl. 197 (1993).
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1981, but that § 272 did cover the launch of certain spacecraft after 1981.131 The reason
for the distinction between launches before and after 1981 was that in 1981, Congress
passed a statute that brought spacecraft within the definition of “vehicle” for purposes of
the § 272 temporary-presence defense.132 This statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2457(k), reads: “Any
object intended for launch, launched, or assembled in outer space shall be considered a
vehicle for the purpose of section 272 of Title 35.”133
Hughes Aircraft involved a patent covering “an apparatus for controlling the
attitude of a spin-stabilized spacecraft.”134 The patentee sought compensation from the
United States for its alleged use of the patented invention in numerous spacecraft.135 Five

131
132

Id. at 231-33, 240-41.
Hughes Aircraft, 29 Fed. Cl. at 232; see National Aeronautics and Space

Administration Authorization Act, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-96, 95 Stat. 1207.
133

42 U.S.C. § 2457(k) (2000). Section 2457 is entitled “Property rights in

inventions.” § 2457.
134

Hughes Aircraft, 29 Fed. Cl. at 201 (citing Velocity Control and Orientation of

a Spin-Stabilized Body, U.S. Patent No. 3,758,051 (filed Aug. 21, 1964)).
135

Id. The patentee sought “compensation in excess of four billion dollars” from

the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1498. Id. This statute provides, in relevant part:
Whenever an invention described in and covered by a
patent of the United States is used or manufactured by or
for the United States without license of the owner thereof
or lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the owner’s
remedy shall be by action against the United States in the
United States Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of
his reasonable and entire compensation for such use and
manufacture.
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of the spacecraft at issue in Hughes Aircraft were developed in partnership with other
nations, such as West Germany and the United Kingdom.136 Before launch in the United
States, each of these spacecraft “was manufactured in another country and funded by
another nation.”137 In addition to advancing other defenses, the United States contended
that 35 U.S.C. § 272 provided a complete defense for any use of the patented invention
because the spacecraft at issue would be only temporarily present in the United States.138
The court first considered whether § 272 applied to spacecraft launched before
1981.139 The patentee argued that such pre-1981 launches should not fall under § 272
because before the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 2457(k), spacecraft “were not vessels,
aircraft or vehicles.”140 The court agreed, reasoning that in the absence of § 2457(k),
“such spacecraft would properly be deemed cargo brought to this country for use (i.e.,
launch), not a vehicle or vessel within the contemplation of the temporary presence
doctrine.”141 The court noted that spacecraft did not fit under the definition of “vessel” or
28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000). “The theoretical basis for [a] recovery [under § 1498] is the
doctrine of eminent domain. In this context, the United States is not in the position of an
ordinary infringer, but rather a compulsory, nonexclusive licensee.” Motorola, Inc. v.
United States, 729 F.2d 765, 768 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citations omitted).
136

See Hughes Aircraft, 29 Fed. Cl. at 224-25, 237-39.

137

Id. at 225.

138

Id. at 231.

139

Id. at 231-33.

140

Id. at 232.

141

Id. (emphasis omitted).
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“vehicle” provided in 1 U.S.C. §§ 3 and 4.142 The court then distinguished Brown143 and
Cali,144 observing that:
In those cases, the entries of the vessels and aircraft
(operating as means of conveyance) were for purposes of
depositing cargo and passengers and initiating new trips
elsewhere. When a spacecraft is delivered to the United
States for the purpose of allowing the United States to
launch it, the spacecraft is the cargo brought here for an
essential use, not a “vessel” or “vehicle” which enters the
United States as a means of conveyance.145
Thus, the court held that § 272 cannot apply to spacecraft launched before 1981.146
The court also considered whether § 272 applied to a certain spacecraft launched
after 1981.147 The court held that § 272 did provide the United States with a defense with

142

Id. at 232 n.46.

The definition of “vessel” under § 3 “includes every

description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as
a means of transportation on water.” 1 U.S.C. § 3 (2000). The definition of “vehicle”
under § 4 “includes every description of carriage or other artificial contrivance used, or
capable of being used, as a means of transportation on land.” 1 U.S.C. § 4 (2000). These
provisions are a part of the Dictionary Act. See infra note 301 (discussing the Dictionary
Act).
143

Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1856).

144

Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120, 1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d,

535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1975).
145

Hughes Aircraft, 29 Fed. Cl. at 232.

146

Id. at 232-33.

147

Id. at 240-41.
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respect to the launch of this spacecraft.148 First, the court concluded that the spacecraft
had to qualify as a “vehicle” under § 272 due to the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 2457(k).149
Second, the court held that the spacecraft was “temporarily” present in the United States
because the spacecraft “entered the United States one time for the sole purpose of being
launched into outer space.”150 Third, the court observed that “the United Kingdom
extends ‘similar privileges’ to ‘vessels, aircraft and vehicles’ of the United States.”151
Finally, the court held that “[t]here can be no dispute” that “[t]he invention—the attitude
control system—was used exclusively for the needs of the vehicle, and the invention was

148

Id.

149

Id. at 240.

150

Id. The court looked to Cali and reasoned that if the systematic presence of

the aircraft in Cali was temporary, then the presence of a spacecraft “in the United States
one time for a short duration” must also be temporary. Id. (citing Cali v. Japan Airlines,
Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120, 1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1975)).
151

Id. The court rejected the patentee’s argument “that the doctrine does not

apply because the United Kingdom does not have a statute making the temporary
presence doctrine applicable to spacecraft.” Id. n.67. The court reasoned:
Section 272 does not require that the United Kingdom and
the United States have identical temporary presence
doctrines—only that the United Kingdom have a doctrine
relating to “vessels, aircraft and vehicles.” Further,
defendant’s expert witness on United Kingdom law
testified that the United Kingdom would apply its doctrine
to a United States spacecraft entering the United Kingdom
temporarily.
Id. (citation omitted).
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not sold or used for manufacture within the United States.”152 Therefore, the court
concluded that for the spacecraft launched after 1981, § 272 provided the United States
with a complete defense to infringement.153

152

Id. at 241. The patentee also argued that an additional condition should be

read into § 272—”that the use of the invention be solely by another country and that the
use be of no benefit to the United States.” Id. at 240 n.66. However, the court rejected
this argument as unpersuasive because the argument was “based on the legislative history
of another provision—42 U.S.C. § 2457(l).” Id.
153

Id. Interestingly, the temporary-presence doctrine as applied to spacecraft also

appeared in an intergovernmental agreement (“IGA”) concerning the international space
station Freedom. Agreement Among the Government of the United States of America,
Governments of Member States of the European Space Agency, the Government of
Japan, and the Government of Canada on Cooperation in the Detailed Design,
Development, Operation, and Utilization of the Permanently Manned Civil Space Station
art. 21(6), Sept. 29, 1988, State Dept. No. 92-65, KAV No. 2382, available at 1992 WL
466295 [hereinafter Space Station IGA]; see Leo B. Malagar & Marlo Apalisok
Magdoza-Malagar, International Law of Outer Space and the Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights, 17 B.U. INT’L L.J. 311, 363 n.260 (1999); Arnold Vahrenwald,
Intellectual Property on the Space Station “Freedom,” 1993 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
318, 323-24. The stated object of this IGA was “to establish a long-term international
cooperative framework among the Partners . . . for the detailed design, development,
operation, and utilization of a permanently manned civil Space Station for peaceful
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C. FOREIGN CASES
Temporary-presence-defense statutes analogous to § 272 exist in many
countries.154 It is interesting to look to the interpretation that foreign courts have given to
these counterpart temporary-presence provisions, particularly because such statutes are
often based on Article 5ter of the Paris Convention—the same treaty provision that
underlies § 272.155 In particular, two cases are notable. Part II.C.1 discusses the first
purposes, in accordance with international law.” Space Station IGA, supra, art. 1(1).
Article 21(6) of the IGA provides:
The temporary presence in the territory of a Partner State of
any articles, including the components of a flight element,
in transit between any place on Earth and any flight
element of the Space Station registered by another Partner
State or ESA shall not in itself form the basis for any
proceedings in the first Partner State for patent
infringement.
Id. art. 21(6). “[I]t was the purpose of this provision to exclude that the transport of
payloads or flight elements of the European partner by US launchers could infringe US
patents—a particular concern to the European partner who will be dependent on US
launchers for some time.” Vahrenwald, supra, at 323. This “IGA was superseded in
1998 by the Space Station Intergovernmental Agreement.” Malagar, supra, at 363 n.262
(citing 1998 U.S. Treaty Actions, 37 I.L.M. 1495 (1998)).
154

For examples of such provisions, see supra note 82.

155

Cf. Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1253 (Fed. Cir.

2000) (looking to U.K. case law to determine whether a provision of U.S. patent law
conformed to an international agreement); Stena Rederi AB v. Irish Ferries Ltd., [2003]
EWCA (Civ) 66, [67] (Eng.) (Munby, J.) (“I am glad to think that on a point arising in
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such case, Rolltrailer,156 in which a German court in 1973 held that the German
temporary-presence statute protected vehicles called “roll trailers” from infringement
liability. Next, Part II.C.2 discusses Stena Rederi AB v. Irish Ferries Ltd.,157 in which an
English court held that the U.K. temporary-presence statute exempted certain ferries from
infringement.
1. Germany: Rolltrailer
In 1973 in Rolltrailer,158 a West German court held that its temporary-presence
statute provided a defense to infringement.159 The patent at issue in Rolltrailer covered
couplings used in conjunction with roll trailers, which “are used to transport containers
. . . onto ships.”160 The court described roll trailers as follows:

this area of the law, relating to international commerce, whether by sea or in the air, and
founded moreover on an international Convention, the courts of this country should feel
able to come to precisely the same essential conclusion as courts in Germany and the
United States.”).
156

LG Hamburg, GRUR Int. 1973, Heft 12, at 703 (F.R.G.).

157

[2003] EWCA (Civ) 66 (Eng.).

158

LG Hamburg, GRUR Int. 1973, Heft 12, at 703 (F.R.G.), translated in Brief

for Defendants-Appellants at B6-B13, Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC
II), 357 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1256) [hereinafter Rolltrailer Translation].
159

Rolltrailer Translation, supra note 158, at B13.

160

Id. at B6 (citing German Patent No. 1,297,999 (published Mar. 26, 1970) and

German Utility Model No. 1,968,449).
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They are loaded with the goods for transportation in the
departure dock, pulled onto the ship thus laden and parked
there for the journey. At the arrival dock they are unloaded
onto the quayside with their load where they are unloaded.
Having been loaded again they can then be used for
transportation on another ship. All in all, they serve to
facilitate and speed up the transportation of goods and to
shorten the time the ships spend in harbour.161
Roll trailers have no means for self-propulsion; instead, they are pulled by tractors.162
The accused infringer was a Finnish shipping company that regularly brought roll trailers
allegedly using the patented invention into Germany on German ships, used the roll
trailers to unload and load cargo, then exited Germany with the roll trailers on the
ships.163 The accused infringer asserted a defense under the German temporary-presence
statute.164 According to the court, pursuant to that statute, “the effect of a German patent
does not extend to equipment on vehicles which enter the country only temporarily.”165
161

Id.; see also SDV

Oilfield, Glossary of International Trade Terms,

http://www.sdvoilfield.com/genst.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2005) (“[‘Roll trailer’ is a]
generic term for a wheeled trailer used for carrying cargo, also known as a mafi. It may
remain on board throughout ocean passage or be used as a ‘slave’ trailer to transport
cargo to and from the vessel once on quay. It has an under layer with a steel chassis and
equipped with solid rubber tyres. It is attached to a tug master with a gooseneck.”).
162

See Rolltrailer Translation, supra note 158, at B6-B7.

163

Id.

164

Id. at B7.

165

Id. at B8. At the time, this statute had not been amended to conform to Article

5ter of the Paris Convention. See Stena Rederi AB v. Irish Ferries Ltd., [2003] EWCA
(Civ) 66, [35] (Eng.) (commenting on the Rolltrailer case).
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At issue was whether the roll trailers in question were vehicles under the statute, whether
they were of another country, and whether they were temporarily present in Germany.166
The court held that roll trailers are vehicles.167
definition of “vehicle” from German case law:

The court relied on a broad

“a vehicle is ‘any object which is

arranged to travel on the earth, in water or in the air, either in the manner of one of the
known transporting means or in some other manner, and in the use of which the
movement plays an essential part.’”168 The court also discussed even broader definitions
of “vehicle” from the literature.169

The court found that roll trailers meet these

definitions of “vehicle.”170 Even though roll trailers themselves have no means for
166

See Rolltrailer Translation, supra note 158, at B8-B13.

167

See id. at B8-B10.

168

Id. at B9. This definition includes ships and aircraft as being “vehicles”. See

id. Thus, this definition is broader than the U.S. statutory definition of “vehicle,” which
includes only land vehicles. Compare id., with 1 U.S.C. § 4 (2000) (“The word ‘vehicle’
includes every description of carriage or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of
being used, as a means of transportation on land.” (emphasis added)).
169

Rolltrailer Translation, supra note 158, at B9. One such definition “state[d]

that the only essential feature [of a ‘vehicle’] is ‘the ability to travel in space.’” Id. The
court also noted that “[t]here is general consent in the literature that all types of vehicles,
without any distinctions, are to be regarded as vehicles in the sense of” the temporarypresence statute. Id. The court also noted “that it does not matter whether the vehicle is
used for carrying people or objects.” Id. (citations omitted).
170

Id.
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propulsion, the court still found that roll trailers are vehicles, noting that according to the
literature, “it is not crucial how the vehicle moves and whether it has its own driving
force.”171 The court also rejected the argument that roll trailers are not vehicles because
they entered the country on ships “without performing [their] natural function as
transporting means.”172 The court emphasized that “[t]he only important point is that the
vehicles are used as such in the country.”173 The court justified its broad interpretation of
“vehicle” with the policy behind the temporary-presence defense: “The imposition of
any more stringent demands is forbidden . . . by the sense and purpose of the provision[],
which is to promote free international trade.”174
The court next considered whether the roll trailers were of another country.175
The patentee argued that the roll trailers were not of another country because the accused
infringer used them on German ships owned by third parties, rather than on foreign
ships.176 The court rejected this argument, stating that “[t]he prerequisite for satisfying
this condition of the application of [the temporary-presence statute] is that the vehicle is

171

Id.

172

Id. The court noted that “[v]ehicles which enter the country, for example on a

railway truck or ship, are also covered by” the temporary-presence statute. Id.
173

Id. at B10.

174

Id.

175

Id. at B10-B12.

176

See id. The patentee argued that the roll trailers “take the nationality of the

ships on which they were carried.” Id. at B11.
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based in another country.”177 The court found that the roll trailers were, indeed, based in
Finland.178 The court again found support for its broad interpretation from the policy
behind the temporary-presence defense:
[O]ne major consideration is that the terms of [the
temporary-presence statute] are . . . designed to promote
trade wherever possible and must be adapted to the
constantly altering circumstances of international transport
in a progressive manner. However, this principle would be
infringed if in determining the home of the roll[] trailers
used by the defendant a decision were based on the ships
which carry them. The result of this would be to force the
[accused infringers], through German patent law, to refrain
from using German ships, irrespective of the increasing
cooperation and interdependency of international transport.
The freedom of international trade would thus be seriously
jeopardised, contrary to the spirit and intention of [the
temporary-presence statute].179
Thus, the court concluded that the roll trailers were vehicles of another country.180
Finally, the court considered whether the roll trailers were only temporarily
present in Germany.181 The court found that the roll trailers were temporarily present
177

Id. at B10.

178

Id. at B11. The court reasoned as follows:
The [accused infringer] obtained the roll[] trailers
from a manufacturer in Finland and brought them from
Finland for their own purposes. Irrespective of their use on
ships owned by third parties these roller trailers continue to
be their property and are administered and managed from
Finland, the country in which the [accused infringer’s]
business is based. They are accordingly based in Finland.

Id.
179

Id. at B11-B12 (citations omitted).

180

Id. at B11.

181

Id. at B12-B13.
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despite “[t]he fact that the roll[] trailers enter Germany regularly and repeatedly.”182
Without explicitly defining “temporarily” as used in the statute, the court’s reasoning as
to the meaning of “temporarily” was time-based.183 The court observed that “after this
stay, as envisaged from the outset, [the roll trailers] leave Germany again after a
relatively short period.”184 The court then speculated that “a stay in the country can only
be regarded as no longer temporary if it lasts for at least several months in one go.”185
The court also rejected the argument that the roll trailers were not temporarily present
because a number of the accused infringer’s roll trailers might always be present in
Germany.186 The court reasoned that “[a]s the subject of the patent infringement is only
the individual roll[] trailer, the only important point is whether the individual roll[] trailer
is only temporarily in the country.”187 Again, the court supported its conclusion with the
policy behind the temporary-presence defense: “This [interpretation] corresponds to the
purposes of [the temporary presence statute], which is intended to protect international

182

Id. at B12.

183

See id.

184

Id.

185

Id. The court found that “this does not appear to be the case here, as indicated

by the purpose and function of the roll[] trailers and the rapidity of modern day sea
travel.” Id.
186

Id. at B12-B13.

187

Id. at B13.
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transport trade from claims arising from patents. Meanspiritedness is not compatible
with this concept.”188
Therefore, for these reasons, the court dismissed the patentee’s complaint, holding
that the temporary-presence statute provided the accused infringer with a complete
defense.189
2. United Kingdom: Stena Rederi Aktiebolag v. Irish Ferries Ltd.
Another interesting foreign case is Stena Rederi AB v. Irish Ferries Ltd.,190 in
which the English Court of Appeal in 2003 held that the U.K. temporary-presence
defense applied to a ferry boat that traveled regularly between Ireland and Wales.191 The
U.K. temporary-presence defense is contained in section 60 of the Patents Act of 1977.192
This statute provides, in relevant part:
(5) An act which, apart from this subsection, would
constitute an infringement of a patent for an invention shall
not do so if—
....

188

Id. at B12.

189

Id. at B13.

190

Stena Rederi AB v. Irish Ferries Ltd. (Irish Ferries II), [2003] EWCA (Civ) 66

(Eng.), aff’g [2002] EWHC (Pat) 737 (Eng.).
191

Id. at [12]-[38]. The Irish Ferries case was the first case in which a U.K. court

interpreted the phrase “temporarily or accidentally” in the U.K. temporary-presencedefense statute. Sharma & Forrest, supra note 23, at 430 n.2.
192

Irish Ferries II, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 66, [12].
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(d) it consists of the use, exclusively for the needs
of a relevant ship, of a product or process in the body of
such a ship or in its machinery, tackle, apparatus or other
accessories, in a case where the ship has temporarily or
accidentally entered the internal or territorial waters of the
United Kingdom . . . .
....
(7) In this section—
“relevant ship” and “relevant aircraft, hovercraft or
vehicle” mean respectively a ship and an aircraft,
hovercraft or vehicle registered in, or belonging to, any
country, other than the United Kingdom, which is a party to
the Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
signed at Paris on 20th March 1883 or which is a member
of the World Trade Organisation . . . .193
The patent at issue in Irish Ferries was for a “multi-hull vessel of the catamaran
type which has two or more hulls connected by means of one or more decks and an
overlying superstructure.”194 The accused infringer allegedly employed this patented
invention in its catamaran, the Jonathan Swift, that operated between Dublin, Ireland and
Holyhead, Wales.195

The court described the use of the catamaran by the accused

infringer as follows:

“The Jonathan Swift is a ferry registered in Eire which sails

193

Patents Act, 1977, § 60 (U.K.). The U.K. temporary-presence statute also

includes provisions for land vehicles and aircraft.

Id.

The language of the U.K.

temporary-presence statute is similar to that of Article 5ter of the Paris Convention.
Compare id., with Paris Convention art. 5ter, supra note 78.
194

Irish Ferries II, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 66, [4]; see also id. at [1] (citing

Superstructure for Multihull Vessels, European Patent (U.K.) No. 0 648 173 (filed June
30, 1993)).
195

See id. at [2].
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between Dublin and Holyhead three or four times a day. On each visit it is in UK
territorial waters for about three hours.”196 At issue in Irish Ferries was: (1) whether the
accused catamaran was temporarily present in the U.K.; and (2) whether the accused use
met the requirement of the U.K. temporary-presence statute that it be “of a product or
process in the body or operation of the” ship, even though “the invention as claimed was
the whole ship” rather than just a part of it.197
In the trial court’s opinion, the court first considered whether the accused ship
was temporarily present in the United Kingdom.198

In interpreting the term

“temporarily,” the court first looked to the negotiating history of Article 5ter of the Paris
Convention, which formed the basis for the U.K. temporary-presence statute.199 The
court noted that the Czechoslovakian delegation “wanted to ensure that regular and
periodical entries into a country were covered by the Convention” and thus changed the
word “penetrate” to “enter.”200 The court also considered the holding of the German
196

Id. at [13]; see also Irish Ferries I, [2002] EWHC (Pat) 737, [62] (“Its home

port is Dublin which means amongst other things that, where possible, it berths there
overnight.”).
197

Irish Ferries II, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 66, [14]-[15]. This requirement of the

U.K. temporary-presence statute is part of the “exclusively for the needs of the vessel”
element.
198

Irish Ferries I, [2002] EWHC (Pat) 737, [64]-[79].

199

Id. at [67].

200

Id. at [68]-[69]. But see Irish Ferries II, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 66, [32]-[34]

(noting that in the original and official French text of Article 5ter, the word “pénétréront
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court in Rolltrailer201 that regular and repeated entries into a country could be considered
to be temporary.202
The trial court observed that the U.K. statute and Article 5ter of the Paris
Convention “are concerned to ensure that trade and the carriage of persons between
countries is not hindered by patent rights applying to the means of transport.”203 The
court noted that “the underlying principle is that the normal operation of the vehicle is to
be taken out of the scope of patent infringement.”204 Thus, consistent with these policies,
the court interpreted the term “temporarily” as follows:
[The U.K. temporary-presence statute] comes into play to
protect the vehicle in so far as it is engaged in inter-State
passage. The word “temporarily” should be construed in
that context. Its primary purpose is to distinguish between
vehicles which are engaged essentially in internal
operations and those which travel between countries. For
that reason, . . . questions of frequency, persistency and
regularity have little to do with determining whether a
vessel is temporarily within the territorial waters of the
[sic]” remained unchanged); infra nn.231-233 and accompanying text (discussing the
Court of Appeal’s reasoning concerning this discrepancy).

A U.S. district court

apparently considered the same negotiating history of Article 5ter in Cali v. Japan
Airlines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120, 1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir.
1975).
201

LG Hamburg, GRUR Int. 1973, Heft 12, at 703 (F.R.G.). For a discussion of

Rolltrailer, see supra Part II.C.1.
202

Irish Ferries I, [2002] EWHC (Pat) 737, [70]-[72].

203

Id. at [73].

204

Id.
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United Kingdom. Temporarily means “for a limited period
of time.”205
The trial court rejected an interpretation of “temporarily” as meaning the opposite
of “permanently.”206

Instead, the court stated that the statute “must be read to be

consistent with [its] legislative purpose.”207 Thus, the court reasoned:
It should be noticed that the legislation is concerned with
ships and other vehicles which “enter temporarily” the
territory of the State. This suggest [sic] that one has to
have regard to the intention of the operator of the vehicle at
the time of entry. If, at that time, it is the intention that the
vehicle should move in and then move out, the entry would
be temporary. Although an exact date of expected
departure may not be necessary, the operator must intend
that the vehicle should continue its journey by leaving the
territory in reasonable time consistent with carrying out its
role as a means of transport used in international carriage of
goods and persons. An expectation that the vehicle may
well leave the State at some time in the future, and in this
sense has not entered the territory on a permanent basis,
should not be enough.208
The trial court also rejected the patentee’s argument that under a broad
interpretation of “temporarily,” “the Jonathan Swift would be held to be temporarily in
205

Id. at [75]. The Irish Ferries trial court’s distinction between internal and

international operations is similar to that of the U.S. district court in Cali. See Cali, 380
F. Supp. at 1126.
206

Irish Ferries I, [2002] EWHC (Pat) 737, [76].

207

Id.

208

Id. The trial court did not decide whether an entry would be temporary “if the

vehicle enters a country’s territory temporarily but, once there, the operator changes his
mind,” though the court did speculate that such an entry would not be considered
temporary. Id. at [77].
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both Irish and British waters and permanently in neither.”209 The patentee argued that
such an interpretation would allow an infringer to escape liability in both countries
because Ireland also has a temporary-presence provision.210

However, the court

reasoned:
It is possible that “enter” should be contrasted with
“return”. A vehicle which returns to its operational home
may not be treated the same way as one which temporarily
visits foreign lands. If that is so, the Jonathan Swift would
not be immune from suit in Dublin, its home port. Thus,
[the patentee’s] reductio ad absurdum that the ship could
not infringe anywhere (other than the place of construction)
would not be true.211
Applying its interpretation of “temporarily,” the trial court concluded that the
accused ship entered the waters of the United Kingdom only temporarily.212 The court
reasoned:
Applying the above principles to the Jonathan Swift, it can
only infringe when it is within our territorial waters. The
issue of infringement therefore has to be looked each time
it is here. Weather permitting, it does not stay in our waters
for more than about three hours at a time. That is the
intention of the operator . . . . The fact that the same
journey is repeated over and over again, does not alter the
fact that each entry into our waters is designed to be shortlived. Indeed, the fact that it is repeated so frequently
emphasises the temporary nature of its entry and the fact
that it is a means of transport being used in the international

209
210

Irish Ferries I, [2002] EWHC (Pat) 737, [65], [77].
Id. at [65]; see Patents Act, 1992, § 42(d)-(e) (Ir.) available at

http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1992_1.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2005).
211

Id. at [77].

212

Id. at [78].
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carriage of goods and people.
temporary.213

Its entry each time is

Next, the trial court considered the patentee’s second argument—that the
temporary-presence defense applied only to patents covering “parts of the ship, not . . .
the ship as a whole.”214 The language of the statute at issue was: “exclusively for the
needs of a relevant ship, of a product or process in the body of such a ship or in its
machinery, tackle, or other accessories.”215 The patentee argued that because the patent
claims at issue were directed to “a multihull vessel, it is the Jonathan Swift as a whole
which is the infringing article[, which therefore] falls outside the scope of the”
temporary-presence defense.216
The trial court rejected this argument for four reasons.217 First, the court said that
there was no “logic . . . in having an exclusion effective against parts but not the whole of

213

Id. The court’s focus on each individual entry of the vessel into the country is

consistent with the German court’s decision in Rolltrailer. See Rolltrailer Translation,
supra note 158, at B13 (“As the subject of the patent infringement is only the individual
roll[] trailer, the only important point is whether the individual roll[] trailer is only
temporarily in the country.”).
214
215

Irish Ferries I, [2002] EWHC (Pat) 737, [80]-[82].
Patents Act, 1977, § 60(5)(d) (U.K.) (emphasis added). This language is

analogous to the “exclusively for the needs of the vessel, aircraft, or vehicle” language of
§ 272. 35 U.S.C. § 272 (2000).
216

Irish Ferries I, [2002] EWHC (Pat) 737, [80].

217

Id. at [81].
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a vessel.”218

Second, the patentee’s proposed construction of the statute would

“undermine” its purpose—”to prevent patents interfering with the means used to carry
international trade.”219 Third, the patentee’s proposed construction was not consistent
with Article 5ter of the Paris Convention, in that Article 5ter “excludes ‘the use of devices
forming the subject of the patent in the construction” of the vessel, aircraft, or vehicle.220
Fourth and finally, although the claims of the patent-in-suit were written to cover the
vessel as a whole, the invention itself “is much more limited”—”the use of the special
strengthening design in part of” the ship, “not the totality of the ship.”221 Therefore, for

218

Id.

219

Id.

220

Id. (quoting Paris Convention art. 5ter, supra note 78).

221

Id. at [82]. The court explained:
If [the patentee] is right, whether or not the exclusion is
effective would be, in some cases, a matter of chance. The
claims here are written in a form which covers the multihull vessel as a whole, but the invention is much more
limited. It is not concerned with most of what goes into the
vessel, such as the design of the propulsion, steering, hull,
hydrodynamics, the accommodation and so forth. The
inventive concept in claim 3 is the employment of the
lattice work and box structure in the superstructure of the
ship. The claims could have been limited to that feature.
The point can be illustrated by reference to the well known
patent example of the invention of a new steam whistle.
Claim 1 of the patent is to the steam whistle. Claim 10 is to
a container ship with a steam whistle attached to the funnel.
It would make little sense if claim 1 was caught by the
subsection but claim 10 was not. For this reason, even if
[the patentee] were otherwise right on this issue, I would
hold that the question whether an act “consists of the use,
exclusively for the needs of a relevant ship, of a product or
process in the body of such a ship” should be answered
purposively. In other words, is the invention the whole ship
61

these reasons, the trial court held that the U.K. temporary-presence statute applied,
providing the accused infringer with a defense to infringement.222
The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the trial court.223 The Court of
Appeal agreed with the trial court’s reasoning but also considered additional materials.224
First, the court considered a case interpreting the word “temporarily” in the context of a
vehicle regulation as meaning “for a limited time.”225 However, the court rejected this
definition, reasoning that the court in that case was interpreting the word “temporarily” in
a far different context—that of “particular road traffic regulations,” rather than
international commerce as in the temporary-presence statute.226
Next, the court agreed with the trial court’s definition of “temporarily”:
The judge was right . . . that the word “temporarily” should
be construed as “transient” or “for a limited period of
time”. That word cannot have been intended to be
construed so that vessels which regularly went between this
country and say New York or Sydney or Rotterdam would
not come within the exception, but vessels who did that
or is it for a part only? In this case the invention or
inventive concept is not the totality of the ship but the use
of the special strengthening design in part of it.
Id.
222

Id. at [83].

223

Stena Rederi AB v. Irish Ferries Ltd. (Irish Ferries II), [2003] EWCA (Civ) 66

(Eng.), aff’g Irish Ferries I, [2002] EWHC (Pat) 737.
224

Id. at [19].

225

Id. at [21]-[25] (citing British Road Servs. v. Wurzal [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1508

(Eng.)).
226

Id. at [25].
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occasionally would do so. Whether a vessel visits
temporarily, in the context of [Article 5ter of the Paris
Convention], cannot depend on frequency.227
The court then found support for this definition in the U.S. Cali case, which the trial court
had not considered.228
The court next considered but disagreed with the trial court’s treatment of the
negotiating history of Article 5ter of the Paris Convention.229 The trial court relied on the
Czechoslovakian delegation’s urging to change the word “penetrate” to “enter” to ensure
that Article 5ter would apply to “regular and periodical entries into a country.”230
However, the court noted that in the original French text, which the trial court had not
considered, the word “pénétréront [sic; pénétreront]”231 remained unchanged.232 Thus,
the court stated that “it is not possible to come to any conclusion as to the effect of [the
Czechoslovakian delegation’s] intervention nor what was the attitude of the SousCommission.”233 However, the word “pénétreront” can mean “will enter” in addition to

227

Id. at [26].

228

Id. at [26]-[31].

229

Id. at [32]-[34].

230

Id. at [32]-[33].

231

The word “pénétreront” means “will enter” or “will penetrate” in French. See

GRAND DICTIONNAIRE: FRANÇAIS-ANGLAIS–ANGLAIS-FRANÇAIS 655 (1993) [hereinafter
GRAND DICTIONNAIRE] (defining “pénétrer” as, inter alia, “to enter” or “to penetrate”).
232

Irish Ferries II, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 66, [34].

233

Id.
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“will penetrate.”234 Hence, the lack of change in this wording does not indicate that the
committee rejected the Czechoslovakian delegation’s proposal. Thus, the negotiating
history of Article 5ter may indicate that the committee intended to include regular and
periodic entries within the scope of Article 5ter.235
The court next considered the trial court’s reliance on the Rolltrailer decision.236
The court observed that the German law applied in Rolltrailer had not been amended to
comply with Article 5ter, so reliance on that case “must be treated with caution.”237
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that the Rolltrailer decision
supported its definition of “temporarily.”238
Additionally, the court looked at a “Guide to the application of the Paris
Convention as revised in 1967 by Professor G. H. C. Bodenhausen who was the Director
of the body now known as WIPO,”239 which the trial court also had not considered.
According to this Guide, under Article 5ter:

“Temporary entry includes periodical

234

See GRAND DICTIONNAIRE, supra note 231, at 655.

235

See LADAS, supra note 6, at 248 (“‘Temporairement,’ it was admitted at the

Conference of The Hague, on the suggestion of the Czechoslovakian delegation,
comprises also the periodical entries of vessels into the territorial waters of another
country.”).
236

Id. at [35].

237

Id.

238

See id.

239

Id. at [36].
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entries.”240 Thus, this source provided further support for the court’s holding that the
accused catamaran was present in U.K. waters only temporarily.
Finally, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that the accused
use met the requirement of the U.K. temporary-presence statute that it be “of a product or
process in the body or operation of the” ship, even though “the invention as claimed was
the whole ship” rather than just a part of it241 for the same reasons the trial court gave.242
The court stated: “The invention is that set out in the claim . . . . However the product of
the invention is the features of the claim which are properly referred to as ‘in the body’ of
the ship.”243 Therefore, the Court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s holding that the
U.K. temporary-presence defense provided the accused infringer with a complete defense
to patent infringement.244

III. NATIONAL STEEL CAR, LTD. V. CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY
In 2004, the Federal Circuit interpreted § 272 for the first time in National Steel
Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pacific Railway.245 The patent in National Steel Car covered a

240

Id.

241

Id. at [14]-[15].

242

Id. at [37].

243

Id.

244

Id. at [38].

245

Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC II), 357 F.3d 1319, 1326 (Fed.

Cir. 2004). Although the interpretation of § 272 was a case of first impression for the
Federal Circuit, it was not the first time a court of appeals considered the statute. The
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type of rail car known as “a depressed center-beam flat car” or a “drop-deck” centerbeam car.246 Railroads use center-beam cars to haul lumber.247 “The car described in the
‘575 patent is a ‘depressed,’ or ‘drop-deck,’ car because the portion of the floor between
the [wheels] is lowered relative to the height of the floor over the [wheels].”248 The

Second Circuit necessarily addressed the statute in Cali v. Japan Airlines Co., 535 F.2d
1240 (2d Cir. 1975), although the Second Circuit did not issue a written opinion.
246

NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1322 (citing Depressed Center Beam Flat Car, U.S. Patent

No. 4,951,575 (filed June 9, 1989)).
247

Id. The Federal Circuit described the center-beam rail car as follows:
The car described in the ‘575 patent is a “center-beam” car
because the primary structure of the car is a truss-like beam
element that runs the length of the center of the car between
the wheel assemblies . . . . Center-beam cars are an industry
standard for hauling lumber, which is piled onto a floor that
extends laterally to each side of the car from the bottom of
the center beam and then secured to the center beam.

Id.
248

Id. The court described two advantages of the drop-deck center-beam “over

the non-drop-deck version”:
First, it can carry a volumetrically larger load. Given the
relatively low density of wood, ordinary center-beam cars
reach volume capacity before they reach weight capacity,
leaving each car inefficiently under-loaded in terms of
weight. Second, the dropping of the deck lowers the car’s
center of the gravity, permitting safer loading, transit, and
unloading because a higher center of gravity renders the car
more vulnerable to tipping.
Id.
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accused infringer, a Canadian railroad company,249 entered into a contract to purchase a
fleet of drop-deck center-beam cars.250 The accused infringer intended to use the cars
ninety percent of the time to haul lumber from Canada to the United States, and ten
percent of the time to haul lumber within Canada only.251 The court described the use of
the cars as follows:
249

The accused infringer was Canadian Pacific Railway (“CPR”), which “is a

Canadian railroad company that owns rail lines in Canada and in the United States and
operates trains on these lines.” Id. at 1323 (footnote omitted).
250

Id.

251

Id. At the time the patentee filed suit, and during the pendency of the suit, the

accused cars had not yet entered the United States from Canada, where they were
manufactured. See id. Thus, interestingly, there could be no actual infringement because
the cars had never been in the United States yet. See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram
Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 527 (1972) (“[I]t is not an infringement to make or use a patented
product outside of the United States.”); Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 195
(1856) (noting that the patent laws “do not, and were not intended to, operate beyond the
limits of the United States”). Thus, it may seem at first glance that subject matter
jurisdiction was lacking, given that the Federal Circuit has held that the patent laws
“cannot be interpreted to cover acts other than an actual making, using or selling of the
patented invention.” Lang v. Pac. Marine & Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761, 765 (Fed. Cir.
1990). However, subject matter jurisdiction did exist in National Steel Car. According
to the Federal Circuit in Lang, “[i]f the controversy requirement is met by a sufficient
allegation of immediacy and reality, we see no reason why a patentee should be unable to
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Because there is no market need for American lumber to be
shipped into Canada, [the accused infringer’s] center-beam
flat cars return to Canada empty 99.2 percent of the time.
Measured either on the basis of days or track mileage
traveled, a center-beam flat car is in the United States
approximately 56 to 57 percent of the time.252
The patentee253 filed a patent infringement suit and moved for a preliminary
injunction.254 The district court granted the motion and issued a preliminary injunction
against the accused infringer.255 “The district court held that neither of the two defenses

seek a declaration of infringement against a future infringer when a future infringer is
able to maintain a declaratory judgment action for noninfringement under the same
circumstances.” Id. at 764. National Steel Car was such a suit for declaratory judgment.
See 1st Am. Compl. at 3, 4, Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC I), 254 F.
Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (No. CIV.A. 02-6877).

Therefore, subject matter

jurisdiction did exist.
252

NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1323-24.

253

The patentee was National Steel Car, Ltd. (“NSC”), which is “a manufacturer

of railway cars.” Id. at 1322.
254

Id. at 1324. The patentee also sued The Greenbrier Companies, Inc., the

manufacturer of the accused rail cars, in a separate action in the District of Delaware. See
Complaint, Nat’l Steel Car v. Greenbrier Cos., No. 02-1427-SLR (D. Del. Aug. 22,
2002).
255

NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1324.
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raised by [the accused infringer] had substantial merit.”256 However, the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court’s decision.257
Because of the contrast between the district court’s interpretation of the language
of § 272 and that of the Federal Circuit, it is interesting to first consider the district
court’s opinion in detail. Therefore, Part III.A first discusses the district court’s opinion
in National Steel Car. Next, Part III.B examines the Federal Circuit’s opinion and
concludes that the Federal Circuit correctly interpreted § 272.

A. THE DISTRICT COURT NARROWLY INTERPRETS SECTION 272
In concluding that the accused infringer’s temporary-presence defense lacked
substantial merit, the district court interpreted the language of § 272 narrowly. At issue
before the district court were almost all the elements of § 272: (1) whether the accused
cars were vehicles of another country; (2) whether the accused cars would be temporarily
present in the United States; (3) whether the patented invention was used exclusively for
256

Id. To succeed in its preliminary-injunction motion, the patentee had to, inter

alia, “demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits.” Id. at 1324-25.
However, no preliminary injunction could issue if the accused infringer “raise[d] a
substantial question concerning either infringement or validity, i.e., assert[ed] an
infringement or invalidity defense that the patentee [could not] prove lack[ed] substantial
merit.” Id. at 1325 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In addition to its temporary-presence defense under § 272, the accused infringer
asserted an invalidity defense. Id. at 1324. Moreover, the accused infringer also asserted
a defense of unenforceability due to inequitable conduct. NSC I, 254 F. Supp. at 572-73.
257

NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1340.
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the needs of the vehicle; and (4) whether the accused cars were sold in the United
States.258
1. Whether the Accused Cars Were Vehicles of Another Country
After discussing the history of § 272259 and examining cases interpreting § 272,260
the district court first considered whether the accused cars were vehicles of another
country.261 With no analysis or explanation, the district court stated: “The accused rail
car, itself, is not a vehicle. It is part of a vehicle—a train. A train satisfies the vehicle
requirement of Section 272. The question is whether the train carrying the accused rail
cars is a vehicle of another country.”262 The court then went on to hold that the U.S.
trains that would be carrying the accused cars were not vehicles of another country.263
The court reasoned that these trains were not foreign vehicles because the railroad
intended to routinely transfer the accused cars from trains pulled by Canadian
locomotives to trains pulled by U.S. locomotives upon reaching particular destinations in
258
259

NSC I, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 555-57.
See id. at 555.

As part of this discussion the court examined Brown v.

Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1856). For a discussion of Brown, see supra Part I.B.
260

NSC I, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 555-56. The court discussed Cali v. Japan Airlines,

Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120, 1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1975), and
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 197 (1993). For discussions of these
cases, see supra Parts II.A and II.B, respectively.
261

NSC I, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 556.

262

Id.

263

Id.
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the United States.264 The court distinguished Brown,265 Cali,266 and Hughes267 because
unlike the situation in National Steel Car, the patented inventions at issue in those cases
“remained a part of a vehicle that was under the flag of the other country when the
vehicle and the invention were in the United States.”268 Thus, the court concluded that
the relevant vehicle, the train, would not be a vehicle of another country.269

264

Id. The court observed:
The accused rail cars will be brought into the
United States on a train powered by a CPR locomotive, and
for as long as CPR’s rail lines continue in the United States,
the cars will remain part of a train powered by a CPR
locomotive. During this period, the accused rail cars are
part of a vehicle of another country.
After the CPR rail lines end in the United States, the
cars will be switched to trains powered by locomotives
owned and operated by United States companies. The cars
will then continue to travel to various destinations in the
United States. The cars will not return to trains powered by
CPR locomotives until the cars return to places in the
United States served by CPR. During the time the accused
rail cars are part of trains powered by locomotives owned
and operated by United States companies, the accused rail
cars are not used in a vehicle of another country.

Id.
265

Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1856).

266

Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d, 535

F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1975).
267

Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 197 (1993).

268

NSC I, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 556.

269

Id..
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2. Whether the Accused Cars Would Be Temporarily Present in the
United States
The district court next concluded that the accused rail cars would not be
temporarily present in the United States for two reasons.270 First, the court reasoned that
the cars would not be temporarily present because “[a]n accused rail car [would] spend
the majority of its time delivering lumber to United States destinations.”271 The court
observed that: “This is not the same as the airplanes in Cali that returned home after
flying into the country, the ship in Brown which returned home after sailing to Boston, or
the spacecraft in Hughes which went to outer space after being in the United States for
the spacecraft’s takeoff.”272 Second, the court held that the cars would not be temporarily
present because the accused infringer would “derive significant benefits from using
[them] in the United States by transporting its lumber on the . . . cars to various
destinations throughout the United States.”273 The court again distinguished Brown, Cali,
and Hughes: “The presence in the United States of the patented invention in Brown,
Cali, and Hughes was temporary because the only real benefits of using the accused
product for the defendants in those cases came when the product was used outside of the
United States.”274 Thus, the court concluded that the cars would not be temporarily
present in the United States.275
270

Id.

271

Id.

272

Id.

273

Id.

274

Id.

275

Id.

72

3. Whether the Patented Invention Was Used Exclusively for the Needs of
the Vehicle
The district court next concluded that the patented invention was not used
exclusively for the needs of the vehicle.276 The court contrasted the situation in National
Steel Car with that in Brown, Cali, and Hughes, observing that in those cases, “the
accused product was being used in a part of the vehicle that was essential to making the
vehicle work.”277 According to the court, in National Steel Car “the trains can work
without the accused rail car. The accused rail car does not help propel the trains, help in
positioning the trains, or help in any other way to make the trains work.”278 Thus, the
court held that the patented invention was not used exclusively for the needs of the
vehicle.279
4. Whether the Accused Cars Were Sold or Offered for Sale in the
United States
Finally, the district court considered whether the accused rail cars were sold in the
United States.280 This portion of the district court’s opinion is redacted.281 However, the
Federal Circuit described the district court’s conclusions as follows:

276

Id. at 557. Recall that the court considered the relevant vehicle to be a train

carrying the accused rail cars, not one of the cars itself. Id. at 556.
277

Id. at 557.

278

Id.

279

Id.

280

Id.

281

See id.
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[T]he district court held that the use of the [patented]
invention in the [accused rail car] did not qualify as a
noninfringing use under section 272 because the language
of section 272 requires that the invention not be “offered
for sale or sold in . . . the United States.” The district court
found that [the car’s manufacturer] had “offered the
accused rail car for sale to at least three different companies
in the United States,” and that “[the accused infringer],
itself, may sell the accused rail cars to leasing companies in
the United States.”282
Therefore, the district court concluded:
Because at least three of the required elements—
being part of a vehicle of another country, temporary
presence in the United States, and use exclusively for the
train’s needs—are not present and because it appears that
the accused rail cars will be sold in the United States, [the
accused infringer’s] defense based on Section 272 lacks
substantial merit.283

282

Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC II), 357 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed.

Cir. 2004) (omission in original), rev’g 254 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
283

NSC I, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 557.

The court also considered the accused

infringer’s invalidity defense for anticipation and obviousness and held that these
defenses lacked substantial merit. Id. at 557-72. Additionally, the court held that the
accused infringer’s defense of unenforceability due to inequitable conduct also lacked
substantial merit. Id. at 572-73. Moreover, the court held that the patentee would suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction. Id. at 573-75. Finally, the
court considered the other two preliminary-injunction factors—balance of hardships and
public interest—and concluded that these factors favored the granting of the injunction.
Id. at 575-77. Thus, the court granted the patentee’s motion for a preliminary injunction.
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The accused infringer appealed the decision to the Federal Circuit.284

B. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT REVERSES THE DISTRICT COURT AND
CORRECTLY INTERPRETS SECTION 272
The Federal Circuit in National Steel Car reversed the district court’s order
granting the patentee’s preliminary-injunction motion.285 The Federal Circuit held “that
284

See NSC II, 357 F.3d 1319. After the district court’s decision but before the

Federal Circuit’s decision, an Oregon congressman introduced a bill that would amend
§ 272 to explicitly include rail cars within its coverage. See H.R. 1946, 108th Cong.
(2003); Bill Exempts Rail Cars from Patent Infringement, 66 BNA’S PAT., TRADEMARK
& COPYRIGHT J. 50, 50 (2003). The bill was sponsored by Rep. Greg Walden (R-Or.)
and cosponsored by Reps. Earl Blumenauer (D-Or.) and Norman Dicks (D-Wash.). Id.
The bill reads: “Section 272 of title 35, United States Code, is amended by adding at the
end the following: ‘This section shall apply to any vehicle that is a railroad car entering
and leaving the United States on a recurring basis’.” H.R. 1946, 108th Cong. (2003).
According to a published report, “[t]he bill seems to have been prompted by” the district
court’s decision in National Steel Car. Bill Exempts Rail Cars from Patent Infringement,
supra, at 50. The bill was referred to the Judiciary Committee. Id. Since then, Congress
has taken no further action. See Bill Summary and Status, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d108:HR01946:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Aug. 8, 2005).
Indeed, such an amendment is no longer necessary in light of the Federal Circuit’s
decision in National Steel Car reversing the district court’s decision and holding that the
scope of § 272 does include a rail car entering and leaving the United States on a
recurring basis.
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the district court abused its discretion in holding that [the accused infringer’s] section 272
defense lacked substantial merit.”286
The Federal Circuit correctly interpreted each of the elements of § 272. Unlike
the district court, the Federal Circuit broadly interpreted the language of § 272.287 Also
unlike the district court’s interpretation, the Federal Circuit’s broad interpretation of
§ 272 is consistent with applicable statutes, precedent, and international obligations, as
well as with the policies underlying the temporary-presence defense. Indeed, the Federal
Circuit’s broad interpretation of § 272 bolsters the value of the temporary-presence
defense in today’s global economy.288
The interpretation of § 272 was an issue of first impression for the Federal Circuit
in National Steel Car.289 The court first set the stage for interpreting § 272 by addressing
the statute’s legislative history.290 Next, the court discussed the Supreme Court’s holding

285

NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1340.

286

Id. at 1334. Additionally, the Federal Circuit held “that the district court erred

in its conclusion that [the patentee] demonstrated that [the accused infringer’s]
obviousness defense lacked substantial merit.” Id. at 1335.
287

See id. at 1325-34.

288

See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of the

temporary-presence defense in today’s global economy).
289

Id. at 1326.

290

Id. For a discussion of the legislative history of § 272, see supra Part I.D.
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in Brown.291 After that, the court quoted Article 5ter of the Paris Convention,292 and then
briefly summarized Cali and Hughes Aircraft.293 Finally, the court analyzed the accused
infringer’s defense under § 272.294

The court addressed in series each of the four

elements of § 272 at issue: (1) whether the accused rail cars were vehicles of another
country;295 (2) whether the accused cars would be only temporarily present in the United
States;296 (3) whether the patented invention was used exclusively for the needs of the
vehicle;297 and (4) whether the accused cars were sold or offered for sale in the United
States.298

291

NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1326-27 (citing Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.)

183 (1856)). For a discussion of Brown, see supra Part I.B.
292

NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1327 (citing Paris Convention art. 5ter, supra note 78). For

a discussion of Article 5ter of the Paris Convention, see supra Part I.C.
293

NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1327-28 (citing Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F. Supp.

1120, 1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1975); Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 197 (1993)). For a discussion of Cali and Hughes Aircraft, see
supra Parts II.A and II.B, respectively.
294

NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1328-34. The court reviewed the district court’s statutory

interpretation of § 272 “without deference.” Id. at 1325.
295

Id. at 1328-29.

296

Id. at 1329-32.

297

Id. at 1332-33.

298

Id. at 1333-34.
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1. Whether the Accused Cars Were Vehicles of Another Country
The Federal Circuit first addressed the district court’s determination that the
accused infringer would not use the patented invention in vehicles of another country.299
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court’s reasoning that the focus should be
on the train rather than the individual accused cars:
Although we recognize that in some instances there
may be ambiguity between containers that are merely the
cargo of a vessel or vehicle, and vessels or vehicles that are
themselves aggregated and transported in a collective
fashion for greater efficiency, we discern no such
ambiguity here: Congress has defined “vehicle” with
sufficient breadth to include an individual rail car.300
The Federal Circuit looked to the statutory definition of “vehicle” in the Dictionary
Act,301 concluding that “[t]his definition controls our interpretation of ‘vehicle’ in section

299

Id. at 1328-29 (“[A]ccording to the district court, the train, not the rail car, is

the relevant vehicle to examine under section 272, and the nationality of the locomotive
determines the nationality of the train.”).
300

NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1328.

301

1 U.S.C. § 4 (2000). A district court recently applied the Dictionary Act in

determining whether an aircraft was a vehicle under the USA Patriot Act of 2001 in a
case involving the so-called “shoe bomber,” Richard C. Reid. United States v. Reid, 206
F. Supp. 2d 132, 138-39 (D. Mass. 2002) (granting motion to dismiss one count against
the defendant because an aircraft is not a vehicle under the USA Patriot Act of 2001); see
Kevin Cullen, More Suspects Are Charged in July 21 London Conspiracy, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 8, 2005, at A7 (describing Richard Reid as “the ‘shoe bomber’ who was
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272.”302 The Dictionary Act broadly defines “vehicle” as follows: “The word ‘vehicle’
includes every description of carriage or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of

convicted . . . of trying to down a Paris-to-Miami flight with explosives hidden in his
sneakers in December 2001”). The court described the Dictionary Act:
The Dictionary Act of the United States Code, 1 U.S.C. § 1
et seq., provides general definitions for a handful of words
appearing within the code, along with general rules of
construction, that apply to the entire code in the absence of
a more specific indication within the statute being
analyzed. Although the Dictionary Act defines but a few
words appearing in the code, the word “vehicle” is one of
them.
Reid, 206 F. Supp. 2d at 138 (citation omitted). The court in Reid further observed that
“the Dictionary Act is not an obscure, forgotten portion of the United States Code, but
instead remains vital to the process of interpreting the rest of the code.” Id. at 139.
Interestingly, some commentators have argued that the Dictionary Act is unconstitutional
for violating separation-of-powers concerns. Gary E. O’Connor, Restatement (First) of
Statutory Interpretation, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 333, 348 & n.78 (2004).
302

NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1328 (citing 1 U.S.C. § 4; Reid, 206 F. Supp. 2d at 138;

P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. § 1, 54 (West 1954)); see
also Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 197, 232 n.46 (1993) (applying the
Dictionary Act definitions of “vessel” and “vehicle” in determining whether § 272
applied to spacecraft).

The Federal Circuit in National Steel Car noted that the

Commentary of P.J. Federico, one of the drafters of the Patent Act of 1952 in which
§ 272 was first enacted, explicitly stated “that the definition of vehicle provided in 1
U.S.C. § 4 would apply to section 272.” NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1328.
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being used, as a means of transportation on land.”303 The Federal Circuit reasoned that
“[t]his definition . . . leads us to define a rail car individually—not only the train as a
whole—as a vehicle within the meaning of section 272.”304

Therefore, the court

“conclude[d] that [an accused rail car] may be a foreign vehicle and therefore” may be
covered by § 272.305

303

1 U.S.C. § 4. Further emphasizing the breadth of the definition of “vehicle,”

this statute is entitled “‘Vehicle’ as including all means of land transportation.” Id.
304

NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1328. To determine whether a rail car falls within the

Dictionary Act definition of vehicle, the court determined that “[t]he ordinary meaning of
‘carriage’ . . . is defined to encompass ‘means of conveyance,’ ‘a wheeled vehicle for
people,’ or ‘a wheeled support carrying a burden,’ such as ‘a gun carriage.’” Id. (citing
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 343 (1993)).
305

Id. at 1328-29. Moreover, the court concluded that the accused rail cars were

“vehicles of Canada [and that Canada] afford[s] similar privileges to United States
vehicles as required by the reciprocity provision in section 272.” Id. at 1328 n.10. The
current Canadian temporary-presence statute provides:
No patent shall extend to prevent the use of any
invention in any ship, vessel, aircraft or land vehicle of any
country entering Canada temporarily or accidentally, if the
invention is employed exclusively for the needs of the ship,
vessel, aircraft or land vehicle, and not so used for the
manufacture of any goods to be sold within or exported
from Canada.
Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 23 (Can.). Although the Canadian and U.S. statutes are, for
the most part, very similar, the scope of the Canadian statute is broader in that it does not
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The Federal Circuit’s reasoning is sound. The Dictionary Act, which the district
court ignored, mandates that a rail car be considered a “vehicle” under § 272.306 Indeed,
where Congress supplies an “explicit definition” of a statutory term, courts must follow
that definition.307
Moreover, even in the absence of such an explicit definition, a rail car falls under
the ordinary meaning of the word “vehicle.”308 When § 272 was enacted in 1952,309 the
relevant dictionary definition of “vehicle” was: “Any kind of a carriage moving on land,
either on wheels or runners, comprehending coaches, chariots, buggies, wagons, carts of
every kind, sleighs, sleds, and the like; a conveyance.”310 Thus, because a rail car is “a
require reciprocity, whereas the U.S. statute does. Compare id., with 35 U.S.C. § 272
(2000).
306

See NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1328.

307

Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000); accord AK Steel Corp. v.

United States, 226 F.3d 1361, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that courts may not
“substitute their own definition for that of Congress”).
308

Where “terms used in a statute are undefined, [a court must] give them their

ordinary meaning.” Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995).
309

“[T]he most relevant time for determining a statutory term’s meaning” is when

the statute “became law.” MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 228
(1994).
310

WEBSTER’S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY

LANGUAGE:

UNABRIDGED 1903 (1951).

OF THE

ENGLISH

To determine the ordinary meaning of a

statutory term, “it is appropriate [for a court] to consult dictionaries.” Huffman v. Office

81

carriage moving on land … on wheels,” a rail car is a “vehicle” under the ordinary
meaning of the word at the time of the enactment of § 272.
Additionally, the Federal Circuit was correct in rejecting the district court’s
implicit view that something must provide its own propulsive power to be a “vehicle.”311
Indeed, there is ample legal authority that a “vehicle” need not be capable of selfpropulsion.

For example, under U.S. statutory and case law, a non-self-propelled

of Pers. Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see The B.V.D. Licensing Corp. v.
Body Action Design, Inc., 846 F.2d 727, 728 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Courts may take judicial
notice of … dictionaries.”).
Additionally, there are even broader dictionary definitions that include aircraft
and watercraft as vehicles. See United States v. Reid, 206 F. Supp. 2d 132, 138 (D.
Mass. 2002) (“An example is found in the seventh edition of Black’s Law Dictionary
(1999), which defines vehicle as ‘any conveyance used in transporting passengers or
merchandise by land, water, or air.’); cf. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 26
(1931) (“No doubt etymologically it is possible to use the word [vehicle] to signify a
conveyance working on land, water or air, and sometimes legislation extends the use in
that direction . . . .”).
311

See Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC I), 254 F. Supp. 2d 527,

556 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (“The accused rail car, itself, is not a vehicle.
vehicle—a train.”), rev’d, 357 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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It is part of a

spacecraft is considered a vehicle under § 272.312 Additionally, many federal regulations
treat non-self-propelled rail cars as vehicles.313 Furthermore, non-self-propelled truck
trailers are considered to be vehicles under federal regulations, state vehicle codes, and
case law.314

312

49 U.S.C. § 2457(k) (2000); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl.

197, 239-40 (1993) (holding that a non-self-propelled spacecraft attached to a rocket is a
vehicle for the purposes of § 272 under 49 U.S.C. § 2457(k)).
313

See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 201.1(t) (“Rail car means a non-self-propelled vehicle

designed for and used on railroad tracks.” (emphasis added)); 26 C.F.R. § 1.190-2(2)
(referring to “a vehicle, such as a bus, a railroad car . . .” (emphasis added)); 49 C.F.R. §
661.3 (“Rolling stock means transit vehicles such as buses, vans, cars, railcars . . . .”
(emphasis added)). But cf. Stena Rederi AB v. Irish Ferries Ltd. (Irish Ferries II), [2003]
EWCA (Civ) 66, [21]-[25] (Eng.) (concluding that the definition of “temporarily” from
case law concerning vehicle regulations was not applicable to a temporary-presencedefense provision because of differing policy considerations).
314

See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 571.3 (“Trailer means a motor vehicle with or without

motive power, designed for carrying persons or property and for being drawn by another
motor vehicle.”); 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 102 (defining a “trailer” as “[a] vehicle designed to
be towed by a motor vehicle”); United States v. A Single Story Double Wide Trailer, 727
F. Supp. 149, 152 n.3 (D. Del. 1989) (holding that a trailer is a vehicle under Delaware
law).
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Finally, the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of “vehicle” is consistent with that of
the Rolltrailer315 court in Germany, which lends support to the conclusion that the
Federal Circuit’s interpretation was correct.316 In Rolltrailer, the court held that non-selfpropelled roll trailers were vehicles, stating that “it is not crucial how the vehicle moves
and whether it has its own driving force.”317 The court further held that the Finnish roll
trailers remained vehicles of another country even though they were deposited on and
transported by German ships.318 Therefore, based on the reasoning of the German court
in Rolltrailer, a rail car is a vehicle, and it remains a vehicle of another country even if is
switched from a Canadian locomotive to a U.S. locomotive. Therefore, for these reasons,

315

LG Hamburg, GRUR Int. 1973, Heft 12, at 703 (F.R.G.), translated in

Rolltrailer Translation, supra note 158. For a discussion of the Rolltrailer case, see
supra Part II.C.1.
316

Cf. Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1253 (Fed. Cir.

2000) (looking to U.K. case law to determine whether a provision of U.S. patent law
conformed to an international agreement); Stena Rederi AB v. Irish Ferries Ltd., [2003]
EWCA (Civ) 66, [67] (Eng.) (Munby, J.) (“I am glad to think that on a point arising in
this area of the law, relating to international commerce, whether by sea or in the air, and
founded moreover on an international Convention, the courts of this country should feel
able to come to precisely the same essential conclusion as courts in Germany and the
United States.”).
317

Rolltrailer Translation, supra note 158, at B9.

318

Id. at B9-B10.
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the Federal Circuit was correct in its broad interpretation of “vehicle” as including a rail
car.
2. Whether the Accused Cars Would Be Temporarily Present in the
United States
The Federal Circuit next interpreted the phrase “entering the United States
temporarily” of § 272.319 The Federal Circuit rejected the district court’s conclusion that
whether a vehicle enters “temporarily” hinges on “either the duration of the vehicle’s stay
in the United States, in relation to the duration of its stay elsewhere, or the benefit of
which the patent owner is deprived by virtue of the exception to patent rights created by
section 272.”320

Instead, the court “define[d] a vehicle entering the United States

‘temporarily’ as a vehicle entering the United States for a limited period of time for the
sole purpose of engaging in international commerce.”321
The court began its analysis by observing that the term “temporarily” in § 272 is
ambiguous.322 The court observed that the plain meaning of “temporarily” is either “for a
brief period” or “during a limited time.”323 However, the court noted that neither of these
definitions was satisfactory.324 With respect to “for a brief period,” the court stated that
319

Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC II), 357 F.3d 1319, 1329-32

(Fed. Cir. 2004).
320

Id. at 1329.

321

Id.

322

Id.

323

Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 2353 (1993)).

324

Id.
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the term “‘brief’ is itself indeterminate.”325 The court reasoned that “[b]rief is only a
relative concept and must be measured in relation to something, but the plain statutory
language, considered in isolation, does not provide sufficient context to determine the
appropriate meaning of brief.”326 The court also rejected “during a limited time” as
unsatisfactory.327 The court explained:
[T]he idea of an entering for a “limited time” provides a
rule that is determinable, but that seems to lead to absurdly
broad results if applied literally without any further
qualifications.
Limited means nothing more than
“restricted in . . . duration.” Entry is literally limited
provided only that it is not permanent. An interpretation of
section 272 that only required a limited entry in this literal
sense—that only required a vehicle to exit the United States
at some point before the end of its useful life—and nothing
more would create a loophole in a patentee’s rights too
large to be a rational interpretation of Congress’ intent.328

325

Id.

326

Id.

327

Id.

328

Id. (omission in original; citation omitted) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW

WORLD DICTIONARY 1312 (1993)). The U.K. trial court in Irish Ferries I similarly
rejected an interpretation of “temporarily” as meaning merely “the opposite of
permanently.” See Stena Rederi Aktiebolag v. Irish Ferries Ltd. (Irish Ferries I), [2002]
EWHC (Pat) 737, [76] (Eng.), aff’d, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 66 (Eng.). According to the
Irish Ferries court, “[a]n expectation that the vehicle may well leave the State at some
time in the future, and in this sense has not entered the territory on a permanent basis,
should not be enough.” Id. For a discussion of Irish Ferries, see supra Part II.C.2.
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Thus, because the use of the term “temporarily” in § 272 is ambiguous, the court
turned to the legislative history of § 272 to determine Congress’ intent with respect to the
meaning of “temporarily.”329 According to the legislative history, Congress enacted
§ 272 to codify the Supreme Court’s holding in Brown v. Duchesne330 and meet the
requirements of Article 5ter of the Paris Convention331 to which the United States is a
party.332 The court noted that both Brown and Article 5ter “suggest that ‘temporarily’
should be interpreted in light of a vehicle’s purpose to participate in international
commerce at the time of entry—namely, a purpose to enter the United States, engage in
international commerce, and then depart.”333 The court explained:
Both Brown and Article 5ter of the Paris
Convention demonstrate a concern to leave the channels of
international commerce, or more accurately the vessels and
vehicles that pass through these channels, free from the
excessive burdens that would result if such vessels or
vehicles had to conform to the patent laws of all nations
that the vessel or vehicle visited during its lifetime.
329

NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1329.

330

60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1856).

331

Paris Convention art. 5ter, supra note 78. For a discussion of Article 5ter of the

Paris Convention, see supra Part I.C.
332

NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1329; see S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 28 (1952) (“This section

follows the requirement of the International Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property, to which the United States is a party, and also codifies the holding of the
Supreme Court that use of a patented invention on board a foreign ship does not infringe
a patent.”), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2422.
333

NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1329-30.
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Different inventions are likely to be patented in different
countries, and the same invention may be owned by
different parties in different countries. In section 272,
Congress intended to join an international movement to
place foreign-owned means of international transport
beyond the reach of domestic patentees’ exclusive rights
because the cost of complying with multiple, inconsistent
rights of exclusion provided by the patent regimes of a
large number of countries would likely place an excessive
drag on international commerce.334
The court also considered as persuasive authority the definition of “temporarily” that the
court in Cali adopted.335 The Federal Circuit noted that like the way it defined the term,
the Cali court defined “temporarily” “in relation to the ‘international trade’ that section
272 was intended to protect, not in relation to the duration of the entry.”336
334

Id. The court also reasoned that the reciprocity requirement in “both Article

5ter of the Paris Convention and section 272 demonstrate the centrality of international
commerce in the statutory scheme.” Id.
335

Id. at 1330-31 (citing Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120, 1122,

1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1975)).
336

NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1330-31 (citing Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1126). Moreover,

the Federal Circuit’s consideration of the accused infringer’s purpose for being in the
country in its interpretation of “temporarily” is similar to that of the English trial court in
Irish Ferries. See Stena Rederi Aktiebolag v. Irish Ferries Ltd. (Irish Ferries I), [2002]
EWHC (Pat) 737, [76] (Eng.) (“Although an exact date of expected departure may not be
necessary, the operator must intend that the vehicle should continue its journey by
leaving the territory in reasonable time consistent with carrying out its role as a means of
transport used in international carriage of goods and persons.”), aff’d, [2003] EWCA
(Civ) 66 (Eng.).
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Next, the Federal Circuit rejected the district court’s two reasons for its
conclusion that the accused rail cars would not be “temporarily” present in the Untied
States.337 The Federal Circuit stated that the fact that the accused rail cars would be
present in the United States a majority of time was “not relevant to the section 272
analysis.”338 Based on its definition of “temporarily,” the court reasoned:
If the cars are entering the United States for a limited
time—that is, they are not entering permanently—and are
entering only for the purpose of engaging in international
commerce—that is, they are entering to unload foreign
goods and/or to load domestic goods destined for foreign
markets—they are entering “temporarily” for the purposes
of section 272 regardless of the length of their stay within
the jurisdiction of the United States.339
Finally, the Federal Circuit observed that “neither the magnitude of the benefit derived by
[the accused infringer] from use of the cars nor the burden imposed on [the patentee]
from the carve-out of [the accused infringer’s] use from the scope of its right to exclude

337

NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1331. The district court’s two reasons that the cars would

not be temporarily present in the United States were: (1) “[a]n accused rail car [would]
spend the majority of its time delivering lumber to United States destinations”; and (2)
the accused infringer would “derive significant benefits from using [the cars] in the
United States by transporting its lumber on the . . . cars to various destinations throughout
the United States.” Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC I), 254 F. Supp. 2d
527, 556 (E.D. Pa. 2003), rev’d, 357 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
338

NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1331.

339

Id.
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. . . is relevant to the section 272 analysis.”340 Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that the
patentee failed to demonstrate that the accused infringer’s defense under § 272 “lack[ed]
‘substantial merit’ because the entering ‘temporarily’ condition [was] not satisfied.”341

340

Id. The Federal Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Cali court that although

the subtraction from the patentee’s right to exclude may be large as a result of § 272,
Article 5ter of the Paris Convention, and Article 27 of the Chicago Convention, “[t]hat
subtraction, although large, appears nevertheless plainly to be what the statutory and
treaty immunities intend.” Id. (quoting Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1127).
341

Id. In addition, the patentee asserted an argument that “raise[d] a question

regarding whether [the accused infringer would] succeed on the merits of the section 272
noninfringement defense.” Id. at 1331-32. The patentee noted the testimony of a witness
employed by the accused infringer that “sometimes . . . the U.S. [r]ailway will grab one
of our [center-beam flat] cars with[out] our permission . . . [a]nd . . . they will move it,
you know load it to another point [in the United States].” Id. at 1332 (omissions and all
but the final alteration in original; footnote omitted). The patentee argued that this
testimony showed that the accused infringer’s cars would enter the United States “in part
with a purpose to engage in domestic, rather than international, commerce.” Id. In
response, the court commented:
Certainly, the unforeseen “grabbing” of one of [the accused
infringer’s] large fleet of cars without [its] permission
cannot lead to a reasonable inference that [the accused
infringer] had a purpose to engage in commerce other than
international commerce.
However, if [the accused
infringer] regularly condones such repeated “grabbing” of
its cars for domestic commerce and [the accused infringer]
receives remuneration for the “grabbing” that is substantial
in relation to the income that the cars produce through their
90

The Federal Circuit’s broad interpretation of the term “temporarily” is correct.
The Federal Circuit’s definition is workable, and it properly takes into account the policy
underlying § 272 based on the statute’s origins in Brown and Article 5ter of the Paris
Convention. The court was correct in holding that § 272 includes vehicles that regularly
or periodically enter the United States to engage in international trade, as opposed to only
vehicles that enter the United States infrequently. Such an interpretation is consistent
with the conclusions of the courts in Cali in the United States,342 Rolltrailer in
Germany,343 and Irish Ferries in England.344 Furthermore, such an interpretation is
use in international commerce, a factfinder could infer that
[the accused infringer’s] intent is not to engage in
essentially international commerce. Based on the current
record, however, we hold that [the patentee’s] allegations
do not deprive [the accused infringer’s] section 272 defense
of substantial merit.
Id. (footnote omitted).
342

See Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1126 (“[The] language [of § 272] was chosen to deal

with an internationally significant matter arising in a world in which scheduled freight
and passenger services by established international carriers by air and sea were likely to
require such an immunity to cover countless articles . . . that could turn out to be covered
by patents in the United States . . . .” (emphasis added)).
343

See Rolltrailer Translation, supra note 158, at B12 (“The fact that the

defendant’s roll[] trailers enter Germany regularly and repeatedly does not alter the fact
that the roll[] trailers enter the country only temporarily.” (citations omitted)).
344

See Stena Rederi AB v. Irish Ferries Ltd. (Irish Ferries II), [2003] EWCA

(Civ) 66, [26] (Eng.) (“Whether a vessel visits temporarily . . . cannot depend on
frequency.”).
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consistent with the negotiating history of Article 5ter, in which a committee considering
the adoption of Article 5ter at the Hague Conference “indicated that the words
‘temporarily’ and ‘accidentally’ were chosen to cover entries into port for more or less
brief periods whether periodically or exceptionally . . . .”345
345

Cali, 380 F. Supp. at 1126 (emphasis added); accord Stena Rederi Aktiebolag

v. Irish Ferries Ltd. (Irish Ferries I), [2002] EWHC (Pat) 737, [68]-[69] (Eng.), aff’d,
[2003] EWCA (Civ) 66 (Eng.); LADAS, supra note 6, at 248 (“‘Temporairement,’ it was
admitted at the Conference of The Hague, on the suggestion of the Czechoslovakian
delegation, comprises also the periodical entries of vessels into the territorial waters of
another country.”).

But see Irish Ferries II, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 66, [32]-[34]

(concluding that the negotiating history was inconclusive because the word “pénétreront”
remained unchanged in the official French text after the Czechoslovakian delegation had
urged changing “penetrate” to “enter” to cover regular and periodic entries).
Additionally, the patentee in National Steel Car could have argued that § 272
should not protect the use of the accused rail cars because of the very nature of these cars.
The main use of these cars was to deliver lumber from Canada into the United States and
then return to Canada. See Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC II), 357 F.3d
1319, 1323-24 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Ninety percent of [the accused infringer’s] lumber
shipments travel from Canada to the United States . . . . Because there is no market need
for American lumber to be shipped into Canada, [the accused infringer’s] cars return to
Canada empty 99.2 percent of the time.”). Thus, the temporary-presence defense of
§ 272 arguably should not apply to these rail cars whose main purpose is to regularly
travel between Canada and the United States. Cf. Sharma & Forrest, supra note 23, at
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Moreover, the Federal Circuit was correct in rejecting the district court’s
definition that would exclude from § 272 vehicles that spend a majority of their time in
the United States. Such an interpretation would fail to further the policy behind § 272 of
encouraging international commerce.

Additionally, such an interpretation would

artificially discriminate between vehicles based on the locations of their countries of
origin and their destinations. For example, a Canadian airplane flying from Toronto to
Atlanta, unloading in Atlanta, and immediately returning to Toronto would spend a
majority of its time within the United States because of geography. In contrast, a British
airplane flying between London and New York would not spend a majority of its time
within the United States because of geography. There is no reason to differentiate
between these two situations in determining whether § 272 applies. Thus, an artificial
distinction based on whether the vehicle spends a majority of its time in the United States
makes no sense.346
436 (“Surely there is an argument that an international ferry that regularly plies only
between two ports and if it is built and acquired solely for the purpose of voyages
between only the United Kingdom and Ireland, cannot claim [temporary-presence]
protection.

An owner or operator of such a vessel should take precautions against

infringing third-party rights.”).

However, such an interpretation of § 272 would be

inconsistent with the underlying purpose of § 272—to protect even regular and periodic
entries of foreign vehicles from patent infringement so as to prevent patent enforcement
from inhibiting international commerce.
346

Similarly, a test solely involving the actual duration of a vehicle in the United

States would also be improper. Such a test would artificially discriminate between
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On the other hand, a pair of commentators has suggested that a broad
interpretation of “temporarily” in a temporary-presence provision is improper because it
would unacceptably decrease the incentive for innovation with respect to inventions used
in means of transportation.347 These commentators argue that would-be infringers can
register their ships in “‘flag of convenience’ states” that offer little patent protection, thus
allowing their ships to be temporarily present in every other country in which they travel,
and thus remaining immune from infringement liability in all those countries.348 Hence,
they argue, such patentees could enforce their patent rights only for the making (as
opposed to the using) of their inventions in the countries in which these ships were
built.349 According to these commentators:

different types of vessels, aircraft, and vehicles. For example, a truck or a rail car
traveling from Toronto to Atlanta to deliver goods and then return to Toronto would be in
the United States for several days because trucks and rail cars are relatively slow-moving
vehicles. In contrast, an airplane making that same trip for the same purpose would be in
the United States only a few hours. There is no reason to make such an artificial
distinction.
347

Sharma & Forrest, supra note 23, at 436-37.

These commentators were

discussing the English Court of Appeal’s broad interpretation of “temporarily” in the
U.K. temporary-presence statute, an interpretation that was similar to the Federal
Circuit’s interpretation of § 272.
348

Id. at 436.

349

Id.
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From a practical perspective, this means that
companies involved in innovation will be required to
maintain a large portfolio of patents and will need to
register in a large number of countries. The extra cost
associated with maintenance of intellectual property rights
can be expected to reduce drastically the incentive to seek
patent protection and, in turn, diminish the incentive to
engage in research and development activities.350
This argument is somewhat specious, however. It ignores the fact that vessels,
aircraft, and vehicles can normally be used not only for international travel but also for
purely domestic travel, for which the temporary-presence defense provides no haven for
infringers.351 The amount of domestic travel that occurs is significant, particularly in
geographically large countries such as the United States.352 Indeed, even if would-be
350

Id. at 436-37.

351

See Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC II), 357 F.3d 1319, 1331

(Fed. Cir. 2004) (defining “temporarily” as requiring entry “with the sole purpose of
engaging in international commerce” (emphasis added)); Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380
F. Supp. 1120, 1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (“The distinction would be between [an aircraft]
manufactured in France, delivered [to the United States] for use . . . in this country for
domestic traffic . . . and a foreign aircraft arriving here on an international flight only to
unload, turn about, reload and depart.”), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1975).
352

For example, in the United States, the number of domestic airline flights far

outpaces the number of international flights. In 2004, there were 11,007,185 domestic
departures, whereas there were only 715,294 international departures. U.S. Department
of Transportation Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Air Carrier Traffic Statistics,
http://www.bts.gov/xml/air_traffic/src/index.xml (last visited Aug. 21, 2005). To access
this data, in the “Customize Table” section:

95

(1) check the boxes “Domestic” and

infringers were registering their vessels, aircraft, and vehicles in “flag of convenience”353
countries to avoid infringement for international travel under the temporary-presence
defense, patentees still could enforce their patent rights against infringers using their
patented inventions domestically.

Thus, the patent system will continue to provide

incentives for innovation in technologies used in means for transportation in spite of a
broad interpretation of the term “temporarily” of § 272.
3. Whether the Patented Invention Was Used Exclusively for the Needs of
the Vehicle
Next, the Federal Circuit considered whether the patented invention was used
exclusively for the needs of the vehicle.354 The district court concluded that the invention
was not used exclusively for the needs of the vehicle because as a structural invention, it
did not “help propel the trains, help in positioning the trains, or help in [some] other way
to make the trains work.”355 The Federal Circuit rejected the district court’s conclusion
and reasoning, holding that the phrase “exclusively for the needs of the . . . vehicle”356
should not be interpreted “so narrowly as to exclude inventions . . . pertaining to the

“International” for “Service Type”; (2) check the box “Total” for “Schedule Type”; (3)
check the box “Departures” for “Airline Operating Statistical Type”; (4) select a date
range of January 2004 through December 2004; and (5) click the “Submit” button.
353

Sharma & Forrest, supra note 23, at 436.

354

NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1332-33.

355

Id. at 1332 (alteration in original).

356

35 U.S.C. § 272 (2000).
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construction of a vehicle.”357 According to the Federal Circuit, “[t]he district court
erroneously overlaid the concept of ‘propulsive needs’ onto the statute; ‘structural needs’
are also encompassed within the plain meaning of the statute.”358
Importantly, the court then observed that its broader interpretation was consistent
with Brown v. Duchesne359 and Article 5ter of the Paris Convention,360 unlike the district
court’s narrower interpretation.361 The court noted that in Brown, the Supreme Court
described its holding as applying to “inventions ‘used in the construction, fitting out, or
equipment’ of a vessel.”362

Likewise, the court noted that Article 5ter applies “to

inventions used ‘in the construction or operation of . . . land vehicles . . . or of accessories
of such . . . land vehicles.’”363 As the court stated, “[t]he text of the Paris Convention
expressly applies to inventions used in either the construction or the operation of a
vehicle, whereas the district court limited the meaning of the ‘exclusively for the needs of
the . . . vehicle’ language in section 272 to only the latter.”364
Once again, the Federal Circuit’s broad interpretation is correct. Importantly, the
Federal Circuit’s interpretation of this element is consistent with Article 5ter of the Paris
357

NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1332.

358

Id. at 1332-33.

359

60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1856).

360

Paris Convention art. 5ter, supra note 78.

361

NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1333.

362

Id. (quoting Brown, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 198).

363

Id. (omissions in original) (quoting Paris Convention art. 5ter, supra note 78).

364

Id. (omission in original).
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Convention.365 Such consistency is necessary to avoid conflicting with the United States’
international obligations under the Paris Convention.366 Indeed, any interpretation of
§ 272 that was inconsistent with Article 5ter would improperly “impair the treaty-making
capacity of the nation or . . . clog its power to regulate foreign commerce.”367
Additionally, the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the “exclusively for the needs of the
. . . vehicle” element is consistent with the holding of the English court in Irish Ferries.368
In Irish Ferries, the court held that the U.K. temporary-presence statute applied where the

365

See id.

366

See Fed.-Mogul Corp. v. United States, 63 F.3d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995)

(“[A]bsent Congressional language to the contrary, statutes should not be interpreted to
conflict with international obligations.”); cf. Stena Rederi Aktiebolag v. Irish Ferries Ltd.
(Irish Ferries I), [2002] EWHC (Pat) 737, [81] (Eng.), aff’d, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 66
(Eng.) (holding that the U.K. temporary presence provision “should be construed in a
way which is consistent with the meaning of” Article 5ter).
367

Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120, 1125-26 (E.D.N.Y. 1974),

aff’d, 535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1975) (discussing Brown); cf. The Amiable Isabella, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 71 (1821) (“[T]o alter, amend, or add to any treaty, by inserting any
clause, whether small or great, important or trivial, would be on our part an usurpation of
power, and not an exercise of judicial function.”).
368

Stena Rederi AB v. Irish Ferries Ltd. (Irish Ferries II), [2003] EWCA (Civ)

66, [18], [37] (Eng.); Irish Ferries I, [2002] EWHC (Pat) 737, [80]-[82].
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claims of the patent-in-suit covered the entire vessel as opposed to just a part of it.369
Likewise, in National Steel Car, the Federal Circuit held that the U.S. provision applied
where the claims of the patent-in-suit covered the entire vehicle—a drop-deck centerbeam rail car.370 Therefore, the Federal Circuit correctly interpreted the “exclusively for
the needs of the . . . vehicle” element of § 272.
4. Whether the Accused Cars Were Sold or Offered for Sale in the
United States
Finally, the Federal Circuit considered the district court’s determination that § 272
did not apply because the accused rail cars were offered for sale or sold.371 The district
court based its conclusion on its findings that the cars’ manufacturer “had ‘offered the
accused rail car[s] for sale to at least three different companies in the United States,’ and
that ‘[the accused infringer], itself, may sell the accused rail cars to leasing companies in
the United States.’”372 However, the Federal Circuit rejected this reasoning.373 With
respect to sales by the third-party manufacturer, the court held that “[t]he ‘offered for sale
or sold in . . . the United States’ provision of section 272 does not apply to sales made by
third parties of embodiments of the invention other than those [embodiments] that

369

Irish Ferries II, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 66, [18], [37]; Irish Ferries I, [2002]

EWHC (Pat) 737, [80]-[82].
370

NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1332-33.

371

Id. at 1333-34.

372

Id. at 1333.

373

Id.

99

temporarily enter the United States.”374 With respect to the finding that the accused
infringer “may” sell the accused cars, the Federal Circuit concluded that “a finding that
[the accused infringer] ‘may’ engage in such conduct is, alone, insufficient to deprive
[the accused infringer’s] section 272 defense of substantial merit.”375
374

Id. (omission in original). The Federal Circuit noted that this reasoning was

consistent with the language of Brown, explaining:
In Brown, the Court noted that the captain would be liable
under the patent laws “if the captain had sold [the
invention] there,” namely in the port of Boston. This
concept—the prohibition on selling the very embodiment
of the invention that had been used in the vessel or vehicle
while the vehicle was temporarily or accidentally in the
United States—has been codified in the language of section
272 that permits the statute’s application only “if the
invention . . . is not offered for sale or sold in . . . the
United States.”
Id. (alteration and omissions in original; citations omitted) (quoting Brown, 60 U.S. (19
How.) at 196).
375

Id. at 1334. The Federal Circuit accepted this finding of fact by the district

court. Id. Moreover, according to the Federal Circuit:
[W]e agree with the district court’s implicit conclusion that
a sale-leaseback arrangement between [the accused
infringer] and a U.S. company would, even at this
preliminary-injunction phase, remove substantial merit
from [the accused infringer’s § 272 defense]. . . . Not only
might the sale-leaseback arrangement constitute a sale of
“the invention,” as prohibited by the language in the second
half of section 272, it also might transform the rail car into
a vehicle of the United States and thus remove the use of
the invention from the scope of the uses provided for in the
first half of section 272.
Id. The court also noted that if in the future, the patentee could show that the accused
infringer decided to sell the cars to a U.S. company and then lease them back, “and that
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The Federal Circuit correctly interpreted the “offered for sale or sold” element of
§ 272 as applying only to sales of the actual temporarily-present vehicles themselves,
rather than to sales of other vehicles embodying the patented invention, including those
by third parties. No object or policy of § 272 supports making a foreign party’s defense
to infringement contingent upon the actions of third parties.376 Section 272 is directed to
what does and does not constitute infringement.377 There is no support for the view that a
third party’s sales activities are applicable to the infringement defense of § 272.
Additionally, the Federal Circuit correctly rejected the district court’s
interpretation of the term “offered for sale or sold” because the district court’s
interpretation contradicts Congress’ use of the same or similar language in other parts of
the Patent Act to refer solely to the activities of accused infringers, not third parties.
“[T]he normal rule of statutory construction [is] that identical words used in different

[this] chosen ownership structure would deprive [the accused infringer’s] section 272
defense of substantial merit, [the patentee might] request appropriate relief at that time.”
Id.
376

Cf. Doyon, Ltd. v. United States, 214 F.3d 1309, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2000)

(quoting Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990)) (“[T]o fully understand the
meaning of a statute, [a court] look[s] ‘not only to the particular statutory language, but to
the design of the statute as a whole and to its object and policy.’”). The major object and
underlying policy of § 272 is to prevent patent enforcement from inhibiting international
commerce. NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1330.
377

See 35 U.S.C. § 272 (2000).
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parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.”378 The sections in the
Patent Act in which Congress used terms such as “offered for sale or sold” or “offers to
sell or sells” are all directed toward the activities of accused infringers.379 Notably,
Congress used the term “offers to sell or sells” in § 271, the section immediately
preceding § 272.380 In § 271, the term “offers to sell or sells” refers exclusively to the
activities of an accused infringer, not the activities of third parties. There is no reason
that Congress would use the phrase “offers to sell or sells” one way in § 271 dealing with
infringement and intend the phrase “offered for sale or sold” to mean something else in

378

Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 250 (1996) (internal

quotation marks omitted); accord Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates v. Sec’y of Veterans
Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
379

See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000) (providing patentees with the right to

exclude infringers from selling or offering to sell the invention); id. § 252 (providing
provisional rights to those who would otherwise be infringers); id. § 271 (defining the
activities by an infringer that constitute infringement).
380

See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).

Subsection (a) of § 271 provides: “Except as

otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or
sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States
any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.” Id.
§ 271(a) (emphasis added).
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§ 272—the very next section of the statute—which deals with a defense to
infringement.381
Moreover, where Congress intended to include the activity of third parties in sales
or offers to sell, Congress used the term “on sale,” rather than the term “offered for sale
or sold.”382 By its use of the term “on sale,” “Congress indicated that it does not matter
who places the invention ‘on sale’; it only matters that someone—inventor, supplier or
other third party—placed it on sale.”383 Hence, had Congress intended the sales activity
of § 272 to apply to any sales of the patent invention, including those by third parties, it
would have used the words “on sale” instead of “offered for sale or sold.” Therefore, like
its interpretation of all the other elements of § 272, the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of
this element is also correct.

IV. THE LIMITS OF SECTION 272
Although the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of § 272 in National Steel Car
provides much guidance as to the scope and meaning of the elements of § 272, it does not
resolve all questions that might arise. Thus, this Part considers what the outer limits of
the scope of § 272 might be. This part examines what the limits might be of each of the
following elements of § 272: (A) “vessel,” “aircraft,” or “vehicle” of another country;

381

See Lundy, 516 U.S. at 249-50 (“[W]e have been given no reason to believe

that Congress meant the term ‘claim’ to mean one thing in § 6511 but to mean something
else altogether in the very next section of the statute.”).
382

See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).

383

Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc., 270 F.3d 1353, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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(B) “affords similar privileges”; (C) “temporarily or accidentally” present; and (D)
“exclusively for the needs of the vessel, aircraft or vehicle.”

A. “VESSEL,” “AIRCRAFT,” OR “VEHICLE” OF ANOTHER COUNTRY
Section 272 applies to “vessels, aircraft or vehicles.”384

This language “is

consistent with the general structure of the United States Code, which distinguishes
among three types of conveyances: vessels, which provide transportation on water;
vehicles, which provide transportation on land; and aircraft, which provide transportation
through the air.”385
The Dictionary Act definition of “vessel” applies to § 272.386 The Dictionary Act
broadly defines “vessel” as “includ[ing] every description of watercraft or other artificial
contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.”387
384

35 U.S.C. § 272 (2000).

385

United States v. Reid, 206 F. Supp. 2d 132, 139 (D. Mass. 2002) (citations

omitted) (determining whether an aircraft is included as a “vehicle” under the USA
Patriot Act of 2001).
386

Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 197, 232 n.46 (1993)

(applying the Dictionary Act definition of “vessel” in determining whether § 272 applied
to spacecraft); Federico, supra note 84, at 214 (“The general definition of vessel and
vehicle in 1 U.S.C.A. §§ 3 and 4 would be applicable here [in § 272].”); cf. Nat’l Steel
Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC II), 357 F.3d 1319, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (applying
the Dictionary Act definition of “vehicle” in determining whether a rail car is a vehicle
under § 272). For a discussion of the Dictionary Act, see supra note 301.
387

1 U.S.C. § 3 (2000).
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Thus, § 272 should clearly apply to any type of ship or boat.388 Indeed, under the broad
Dictionary Act definition of “vessel,”389 § 272 should apply to even a raft, a kayak, a
small rowboat, or a JET SKI® watercraft. However, it is doubtful that such a vessel
would meet the “entering the United States temporarily” element of § 272 as the Federal
Circuit has defined it—”entering for a period of time of finite duration with the sole
purpose of engaging in international commerce”390—because a vessel of this type would
likely not be used to engage in international commerce.
With respect to “aircraft,” the Dictionary Act does not define this term.391
However, the plain meaning of “aircraft” according to a dictionary definition392 is: “A
388

When it emerged in the nineteenth century, the temporary-presence defense

applied only to watercraft. See Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 198-99
(1856) (“[T]he rights of property and exclusive use granted to a patentee does not extend
to a foreign vessel lawfully entering one of our ports; and that the use of such
improvement, in the construction, fitting out, or equipment of such vessel, while she is
coming into or going out of a port of the United States, is not an infringement of the
rights of an American patentee, provided it was placed upon her in a foreign port, and
authorized by the laws of the country to which she belongs.” (emphasis added)); Moffat,
supra note 23, at 30 (quoting the first British temporary-presence statute as applying to
“any foreign ship or vessel”). Thus, given its origins, it is logical that § 272 should apply
broadly to any type of ship or boat.
389

1 U.S.C. § 3.

390

NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1331 (emphasis added).

391

See 1 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (2000).
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machine or device, such as an airplane, a helicopter, a glider, or a dirigible, that is
capable of atmospheric flight.”393 Thus, keeping with the broad definitions of “vessel”
and “vehicle” under the Dictionary Act,394 “aircraft” should be defined broadly under
§ 272. Hence, any type of flying machine should be included—even a balloon or a
blimp, for example.
With respect to “vehicle,” the Dictionary Act definition applies.395

The

Dictionary Act defines “vehicle” as “includ[ing] every description of carriage or other
artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on
land.”396 This broad definition encompasses every type of land vehicle—such as rail
cars, trucks, and automobiles. Even small land vehicles such as motorcycles, bicycles,
392

Where “terms used in a statute are undefined, [a court must] give them their

ordinary meaning.” Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995). To
determine the ordinary meaning of a statutory term, “it is appropriate [for a court] to
consult dictionaries.” Huffman v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2001); see The B.V.D. Licensing Corp. v. Body Action Design, Inc., 846 F.2d 727, 728
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Courts may take judicial notice of … dictionaries.”).
393

AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 46, at 38.

394

1 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4.

395

Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC II), 357 F.3d 1319, 1328 (Fed.

Cir. 2004) (“[The Dictionary Act] definition controls our interpretation of ‘vehicle’ in
section 272 . . . .”); Federico, supra note 84, at 214 (“The general definition of vessel and
vehicle in 1 U.S.C.A. §§ 3 and 4 would be applicable here [in § 272].”).
396

1 U.S.C. § 4.
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and skateboards fit within this definition.397 However, as discussed above in connection
with small watercraft,398 it is doubtful that such small vehicles would meet the “entering
the United States temporarily” element of § 272 because vehicles of this type would
likely not be used to engage in international commerce.399
With respect to the limits of what constitutes a “vehicle” under § 272, the Federal
Circuit noted in National Steel Car “that in some instances there may be ambiguity
between containers that are merely the cargo of a vessel or vehicle, and vessels or
vehicles that are themselves aggregated and transported in a collective fashion for greater
efficiency.”400 The German court in Rolltrailer confronted a similar issue and held that
roll trailers were vehicles under the German temporary-presence statute.401 Roll trailers
“are used to transport containers . . . onto ships.”402 Roll trailers lack any means for selfpropulsion; instead, they are pulled by tractors on and off of the ships.403 Nevertheless,
the court held that such roll trailers were vehicles rather than cargo.404

397

Cf. LADAS, supra note 6, at 250 (“Engines of locomotion for land [under

Article 5ter of the Paris Convention] may range from a train to a bicycle.”).
398

See supra p. 105.

399

See NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1331.

400

Id. at 1328.

401

Rolltrailer Translation, supra note 158, at B8-B10.

402

Id. at B6.

403

See id. at B6-B7.

404

See id. at B8-B10.
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An interesting question that might arise in this context relates to intermodal
containers—containers used to ship goods on multiple forms of transportation, usually
ships, rail cars, and trucks.405 Such containers typically arrive in the United States on
ships from foreign countries.406 These containers are then transferred to rail cars,407

405

See James P. Miller, Trains Trucking Farther Out: 2 Intermodal Transfer

Sites Located Away from Chicago, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 9, 2003, § 5, at 1; see also THE CAR
AND

LOCOMOTIVE CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN PRACTICES 205 (6th ed. 1997) [hereinafter

CYCLOPEDIA]; Yuri V. Yevdokimov, Measuring Economic Benefits of Intermodal
Transportation, 27 TRANSP. L.J. 439, 440 (2000) (“Intermodal transportation can be
thought of as a process for transporting freight and passengers by means of a system of
interconnected networks, involving various combinations of modes of transportation, in
which all of the components are seamlessly linked and efficiently combined.”);
Wikipedia,

Intermodal

Freight

Transport,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intermodal_freight_transport (last visited Aug. 28, 2005).
See generally Donovan, supra note 10 (describing how intermodal transportation using
containers has “transformed surface freight transportation worldwide”).
406

Miller, supra note 405.

Many such containers arrive on the west coast

containing goods from Asia. See id.
407

Not surprisingly, rail cars that haul intermodal containers are called intermodal

rail cars. See CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 405, at 205. Such intermodal rail cars are often
“double-stack” cars, which provide for two containers to be stacked on top of each rail
car. See id.; Wikipedia, supra note 405.
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which take the containers to their next destinations.408 Eventually, when the containers
are near their final destinations, the containers are transferred to trucks, which then
deliver them to their final destinations.409 Intermodal containers are much like the roll
trailers at issue in Rolltrailer. However, unlike roll trailers, intermodal containers do not
have wheels. As such, they must be loaded and unloaded from ships, rail cars, or trucks
using crane equipment,410 rather than pulled by tractors as with roll trailers.
A court could consider that intermodal containers are “vehicles” under § 272.
Intermodal containers are “artificial contrivance[s] used . . . as a means of transportation
on land.”411 After arriving on foreign ships, intermodal containers are used to transport
goods on land on rail cars or trucks. After being loaded onto rail cars or truck, the
containers essentially become part of the rail cars or trucks—i.e., they are “vehicles that
are themselves aggregated and transported in a collective fashion for greater

408
409

Miller, supra note 405.
Id.

Before the use of containers became popular, intermodal operations

involved the use of trailers with wheels, rather than containers. See CYCLOPEDIA, supra
note 405, at 205; Wikipedia, supra note 405. This use of trailers on rail cars was
commonly called “piggyback” service. Id.
410

Miller, supra note 405 (“A gantry crane . . . is used to transfer large cargo

containers onto trucks.”).
411

1 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
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efficiency.”412 Moreover, applying § 272 to intermodal containers is consistent with the
importance of containerized intermodal shipping to today’s global economy.413
On the other hand, intermodal containers could be outside the scope of § 272.
They arguably fall into the category of “containers that are merely the cargo of a vessel or
vehicle.”414

Indeed, they are called containers.

Although in some sense they do

essentially become part of the rail cars or trucks onto which they are loaded, in another
sense they are more like boxes of goods loaded onto rail cars or trucks rather than
aggregated vehicles. Arguably, if intermodal containers were considered to be vehicles
under § 272, then boxes of goods would also have to be considered to be vehicles.
Moreover, intermodal containers lack wheels. Thus, unlike the roll trailers at issue in the
German Rolltrailer case, intermodal containers could never themselves be used “as a
means of transportation on land,”415 even with the help of a trailer or other source of
propulsion. Therefore, intermodal containers lie near the edge of what constitutes a
“vehicle” under § 272—perhaps just beyond that edge.

412

Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC II), 357 F.3d 1319, 1328 (Fed.

Cir. 2004).
413

See Donovan, supra note 10, at 13 (“[C]ontainerization has taken global

commerce to new levels of integration and has brought greatly increased wealth to many
parts of the world.”); see also supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (discussing the
importance of the temporary-presence defense in today’s global economy).
414

Id.

415

1 U.S.C. § 4.
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B. “AFFORDS SIMILAR PRIVILEGES”
Section 272 requires reciprocity in that it applies to “any vessel, aircraft or vehicle
of any country which affords similar privileges to vessels, aircraft, or vehicles of the
United States.”416 An issue could arise as to whether the “affords similar privileges”
language means that the foreign country must merely have a temporary-presence
provision similar to § 272, or whether it means that the foreign country must interpret its
temporary-presence provision as applying to the situation at hand. For example, in the
situation in National Steel Car, although Canada has a temporary-presence provision
similar to § 272,417 Canadian courts could have narrowly interpreted this provision as not
covering a rail car entering Canada to deliver lumber and then returning to the United
States. Thus, in this hypothetical example, in spite of the existence of a Canadian
temporary-presence statute, Canada really would not “afford similar privileges” to U.S.
rail cars present under similar circumstances in Canada. Hence, § 272 arguably should
not apply to Canadian rail cars in this example, in spite of the existence of the Canadian
temporary-presence statute.
However, the court in Hughes Aircraft rejected such an argument.418 In Hughes
Aircraft, the patentee argued “that the doctrine does not apply because the United
Kingdom does not have a statute making the temporary presence doctrine applicable to

416

35 U.S.C. § 272 (2000).

417

Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 23 (Can.). For the text of this statute, see supra

note 305.
418

Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 197, 241 n.67 (1993)
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spacecraft.”419 The court concluded that “[s]ection 272 does not require that the United
Kingdom and the United States have identical temporary presence doctrines—only that
the United Kingdom have a doctrine relating to ‘vessels, aircraft and vehicles.’”420
Indeed, the wording of § 272 is “affords similar privileges to vessels, aircraft, or vehicles
of the United States,”421 not “affords similar privileges to similar vessels, aircraft, or
vehicles.” Thus, the reciprocity requirement of § 272 is likely met where the foreign
nation in question merely provides for a temporary-presence defense similar to that of
§ 272.422

C. “TEMPORARILY OR ACCIDENTALLY” PRESENT
The Federal Circuit interpreted “entering the United States temporarily” in § 272
as meaning “entering for a period of finite duration with the sole purpose of engaging in
international commerce.”423

A vehicle goes beyond the limits of being temporarily

present under § 272 once it engages in any domestic commerce, rather than purely

419

Id.

420

Id.

421

§ 272.

422

Such a provision could be created by a statute (such as § 272 today), case law

(such as in Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1856) before the enactment of
§ 272), or even a self-executing treaty between the United States and the country in
question.
423

Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC II), 357 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed.

Cir. 2004).
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international commerce.424 Thus, the rail cars in National Steel Car would have been
outside the protection of § 272 had they entered the United States with Canadian lumber,
dropped it off, reloaded with cargo, and delivered that cargo to another U.S.
destination.425 On the other hand, § 272 would still protect these rail cars if they were to
reload with cargo in the United States and ship the cargo directly back to Canada, instead
of returning empty to Canada.426
Unlike the term “temporarily,” no court has ever interpreted what an “accidental”
presence would be under § 272. “Temporarily” and “accidentally” cannot mean the same
thing; otherwise the use of “accidentally” in addition to “temporarily” would be
redundant.427 Thus, unlike for a temporary entry,428 there should be no time or purpose
424

See id. at 1331-32; Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120, 1126

(E.D.N.Y. 1974) (“The distinction would be between [an aircraft] manufactured in
France, delivered [to the United States] for use . . . in this country for domestic traffic . . .
and a foreign aircraft arriving here on an international flight only to unload, turn about,
reload and depart.”), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1975).
425

See NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1332.

426

See id. at 1331 n.12.

427

See, e.g., United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 59 (1997) (“The Court will

avoid an interpretation of a statute that ‘renders some words altogether redundant.’”);
Clark v. United States, 322 F.3d 1358, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Alaska, 521 U.S. at
59).
428

NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1331 (restricting temporary entries under § 272 to those of

“finite duration with the sole purpose of engaging in international commerce”).
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restriction on an accidental entry into the United States. Indeed, if a vessel, aircraft, or
vehicle enters the United States accidentally, it should be immune from infringement
liability under § 272 even if it then remains in the United States permanently.429
The ordinary meaning of “accidental” is:

“Occurring unexpectedly,

unintentionally, or by chance.”430 Hence, any unexpected or unintentional entry into the
United States should be accidental under § 272.431 For example, the following should be
429

Cf. Stena Rederi AB v. Irish Ferries Ltd. (Irish Ferries II), [2003] EWCA

(Civ) 66, [25] (Eng.) (“The purpose of [Article 5ter of the Paris Convention] was to
prevent national patents impinging upon foreign vessels coming into and out of territorial
waters temporarily and also permanently if the cause was accidental.” (emphasis added));
Stena Rederi Aktiebolag v. Irish Ferries Ltd. (Irish Ferries I), [2002] EWHC (Pat) 737,
[66] (Eng.) (“These two words are intended to deal with unrelated activities,
[“temporarily”] being concerned with deliberate short-term entries, [and “accidentally”]
being concerned with unintentional entries, no matter how long they last.” (emphasis
added)), aff’d, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 66 (Eng.). But cf. Cali v. Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F.
Supp. 1120, 1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (“[T]he committee [drafting Article 5ter of the Paris
Convention] indicated that the words ‘temporarily’ and ‘accidentally’ were chosen to
cover entries into port for more or less brief periods whether periodically or exceptionally
and whether unintentionally or not.” (emphasis added)), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir.
1975).
430

AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 46, at 11.

431

See, e.g., Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995) (“[Where]

terms used in a statute are undefined, [a court must] give them their ordinary meaning.”).
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accidental entries into the United States: (1) a foreign ship taking unplanned refuge in a
U.S. port because of a storm; (2) a foreign airplane making an emergency landing at a
U.S. airport because of engine trouble; and (3) a foreign rail car entering the United
States on a train diverted to an alternate track to avoid a derailment on the foreign track
on which it was originally supposed to have traveled.

D. “EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE NEEDS OF THE VESSEL, AIRCRAFT OR
VEHICLE”
The interpretation of the “exclusively for the needs” element of § 272 must be
consistent with Brown v. Duchesne and Article 5ter of the Paris Convention.432 The
holding of Brown applies to inventions used “in the construction, fitting out, or
equipment of such vessel.”433 Similarly, Article 5ter applies to inventions used “in the
body of [a] vessel, in the machinery, tackle, gear and other accessories” or “in the
construction or operation of aircraft or land vehicles.”434 Thus, the “exclusively for the
needs” language of § 272 should be broadly interpreted.435
432

See NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1333.

433

Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 198 (1856)

434

Paris Convention art. 5ter, supra note 78.

As one commentator

Unlike § 272, Article 5ter has

different provisions for vessels on the one hand and vehicles and aircraft on the other
hand with respect to the “exclusively for the needs” requirement.
435

Cf. LADAS, supra note 6, at 249 (“The needs of the vessel [under Article 5ter of

the Paris Convention] must be understood in a broad sense, as including every apparatus
or machine necessary for the navigation, fitting out, and good equipment of a vessel.”);
Moffat, supra note 23, at 40 (“It might well be argued that every piece of equipment
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suggested in 1930 concerning Article 5ter: “This wide exemption is justified by the nature
of the modern vessel, by the fact that a ship enters only the territorial waters of a country,
and by a desire to exempt vessels from all unnecessary inconveniences and
impediments.”436
Under such a broad interpretation of this element, something such as the heating
and air conditioning system of a vehicle should be included within the scope of § 272.437
Even something such as a DVD player built into a minivan could be considered within
the scope of § 272 because it is part of the “construction . . . or equipment”438 of the
throughout a ship, whether it be a winch or a can-opener, is employed exclusively for the
needs of the ship [under Article 5ter.”). But cf. Sharma & Forrest, supra note 23, at 436
(“The wording of [the U.K. temporary-presence statute and Article 5ter] shows that the
exemption is narrow, covering only ‘use’ of patented invention [sic] and that which is
‘exclusively for the needs’ of the vessel.”).
436

LADAS, supra note 6, at 249; see also NSC II, 357 F.3d at 1330 (“Article 5ter

of the Paris Convention demonstrate[s] a concern to leave the channels of international
commerce, or more accurately the vessels and vehicles that pass through these channels,
free from the excessive burdens that would result if such vessels or vehicles had to
conform to the patent laws of all nations that the vessel or vehicle visited during its
lifetime.”).
437

Cf. LADAS, supra note 6, at 249 (“[The needs of a vessel under Article 5ter of

the Paris Convention] include machinery necessary for the lighting of the ship, its
heating, and the like.”).
438

Brown, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 198.
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minivan and used for the needs of its passengers.439 Moreover, different vessels, aircraft,
and vehicles have different needs.440 For example, the needs of a cruise ship involve the
entertainment of its passengers. Thus, even a slot machine built into such a cruise ship
could be considered to be used exclusively for the needs of the vessel.441

This

interpretation is consistent with the underlying purpose of § 272 and would allow such a
cruise ship to travel from country to country unfettered by the burden of “complying with
multiple, inconsistent rights of exclusion provided by the patent regimes of [these]
countries.”442

439

See 5 CHISUM, supra note 52, § 16.05[4], at 16-247 (“The phrase ‘exclusively

for the needs of the vessel, aircraft of vehicle’ in Section 272 should cover any use for the
benefit of the passengers or crew or for the operation of the vessel.” (emphasis added)).
But cf. Sharma & Forrest, supra note 23, at 436 (“If the device, for instance, is equipment
for entertainment, then this should not be covered by the exemption [in the U.K.
temporary-presence statute].”).
440

See LADAS, supra note 6, at 249 (“Every vessel has different needs. A floating

hospital, a cargo boat, a sailboat, and a steamer have not the same needs.”).
441

If the slot machine were not actually part of the construction of the boat,

however, it should not be considered to be used exclusively for the needs of the vessel.
442

Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. (NSC II), 357 F.3d 1319, 1330 (Fed.

Cir. 2004).
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V. CONCLUSION
Although it may not be well-known, the temporary-presence defense of 35 U.S.C.
§ 272 is a potentially powerful defense under the proper circumstances. This defense
protects foreign vessels, aircraft, or vehicles from patent infringement liability where
these vessels, aircraft, or vehicles enter the United States temporarily or accidentally.
Thanks to the Federal Circuit’s recent broad and correct interpretation of the scope of
§ 272, the temporary-presence defense should assume an increasingly important role in
today’s global economy. Indeed, the Federal Circuit’s decision should ensure that the
temporary-presence defense will continue to prevent patent enforcement from interfering
with the “planes, trains, and automobiles” of international commerce.
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